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Abstract
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing model has been applied to many application fields over the last
decade. P2P protocols made their way from infamous – and frequently illicit – file sharing applica-
tions towards serious applications, e.g., in entertainment, audio/video conferencing, or critical ap-
plications like smart grid, Car-2-Car communication, or Machine-to-Machine communication. Some
of the reasons for that are P2P’s decentralized design that inherently provides for fault tolerance to
non-malicious faults. However, the base P2P scalability and decentralization requirements often re-
sult in design choices that negatively impact their robustness to varied security threats. A prominent
vulnerability are Eclipse attacks (EA) that aim at information hiding and consequently perturb a P2P
overlay’s reliable service delivery. This dissertation provides the necessary background to understand
the different types and inherent complexity of EAs, the susceptibility of many P2P protocols to EAs,
and a mitigation technique for the localized EA variant. The applicability of the proposed mitigation
technique has been validated experimentally and shows for a wide range of system parameters and
application scenarios good mitigation rates reaching up to 100%.
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Zusammenfassung
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Computing hat sich in der letzten Dekade für vielerlei Anwendungsgebiete erfolg-
reich bewährt. Ursprünglich in der janusköpfigen Filesharing-Szene sehr beliebt, hat P2P Einzug in
die Unterhaltungsmedien-Verbreitung, Internet-Telefonie, Videokonferenzen, aber auch in kritische
Anwendungsgebiete wie die des Smart Grid, Car-2-Car Kommunikation, oder Machine-to-Machine
Kommunikation gehalten. Das grundlegend verteilte Design vieler P2P-Protokolle spiegelt sich u.a.
in hervorragender Fehlertoleranz im Hinblick auf zufällige Fehler wider. Weitere P2P-Eigenschaften,
wie z.B. Skalierbarkeit und Dezentralisierung haben oftmals Design-Entscheidungen zur Folge, die
sich negativ auf die Widerstandsfähigkeit gegen Angriffe auswirken. Ein bekanntes Beispiel aus dem
Bereich der Angriffe gegen P2P-Systeme ist die Eclipse Attacke (EA). EAn zielen darauf ab, gewisse
Teile eines P2P-Netzwerks auszublenden, d.h., es wird Teilnehmern im P2P-System erschwert oder
unmöglich gemacht, auf gewisse Services zuzugreifen. Diese Dissertation widmet sich im Detail un-
terschiedlichen EA-Varianten und zeigt weitverbreitete P2P-Design-Eigenschaften auf, die zur Ver-
wundbarkeit führen. Des Weiteren schlagen wir eine neue Technik vor, mit der P2P-Protokolle gegen
sogenannte lokale EAn resistent werden. Wir haben die Anwendung dieser Technik experimentell für
eine große Anzahl Parameter validiert und konnten die lokalen EA-Angriffe in bis zu 100% der Fälle
verhindern.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing made its way from infamous – and mostly
illicit – file sharing applications towards a diverse set of application domains. These include instant
messaging, video conferencing, web technologies, streaming media, JXTA, or VoIP communication to
name just a few of them. Furthermore, a diverse set of critical applications is considering P2P as an
enabling technology as well, such as critical information infrastructures, Car-2-Car communication,
or the more generic case of machine-to-machine (M2M) communication [STFG13, CDF+14]. M2M
is essential for the Internet of Things (IoT) or the Internet of Everything (IoE) [Cis15] which provide
more application scenarios, for example home automation, pervasive health monitoring through
wearable devices, or renewable energy utilization through the Smart Grid. A growth by 45% for
mobile, M2M-enabled devices is expected for the timespan from 2014 to 2019, totaling in 11.5 billion
devices by 2019 (outranking the projected world population of 7.6 billion at that time) [Cis15].
M2M communication infrastructure requirements correspond very good with P2P protocol features
and we believe that various M2M systems will be built upon P2P architectures [STFG13, CDF+14].
Widely appreciated P2P benefits – not only for the field of M2M – are decentralization, collaborative
computing, virtual overlay topologies independent of the physical network topology, information
aggregation and dispersal, fault tolerance, and scalability into the millions of participating peers
(and beyond). Prominent P2P protocol use cases are data dissemination and data discovery. The first
one provides data to a multitude of consuming peers, as it is the case for streaming media or file
sharing. The second one, i.e., data discovery, provides fast access to a large amount of comparably
small data sets. Usually, these two use cases are combined in a single system, in other words, no data
dissemination comes without data discovery.
Several widely applied design choices in P2P protocols foster scalability and fault tolerance. For
example, peers have only partial knowledge about the overlay network, this is a choice to underpin
scalability as knowing all other present peers of the overlay would quickly overstrain maintenance
efforts. Moreover, their communication is redundantly designed to overcome failing peers and ensure
delivery.
A dependable and secure system is clearly desirable, especially when those systems take respon-
sibilities in autonomous car communication or health monitoring. While a dependable system over-
comes random failures in hard- and software with common responses like redundancy and replication
techniques, these responses are naturally insufficient to deal with an adversary that is attacking the
system. Adversaries focus on specific system weaknesses and once they have identified them, they
might modify the system, and potentially sneak in their own malicious resources to finally put the
overall system at stake.
The so called Eclipse Attack (EA) [SCDR04] is in the focus of this thesis. It exploits fundamen-
tal P2P protocol features to launch an attack comparable to a combination of man-in-the-middle,
routing table poisoning, and distributed denial-of-service attacks, which are individually well known
from client/server architectures. As a consequence, attacked peers are hindered in providing their
correct service to the rest of the overlay. In more detail, we analyze EAs with substantial focus on
localized EA variants [SNDW06, SENB07, CCFD13], i.e., those attacking a specific subset of peers in
an overlay. Peers ought to be symmetric, i.e., they should provide both, client and server functionality
at once. Also, peers have to provide identical software interfaces for exchangeability reasons. While
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peers are considered symmetric in terms of service interfaces, the data maintained by peers is highly
asymmetric and the amount of data copies in an overlay is rather small compared to the overall
amount of peers. Hence, an attacker might only harm a limited set of peers and therefore launches a
localized EA against that set. We expect that the importance of localized EA variants grows with the
overall amount of connected devices in the overlay network, since non-localized variants turn out
to be unprofitable in large systems due to their high cost. At next, we provide a technical problem
description for the susceptibility to localized EAs.
1.1 Problem Context
EAs have been discussed for more than a decade [SCDR04] and over the last years localized at-
tacks [SNDW06, SENB07, CCFD13] became the focus of attention. Although several P2P protocol
design choices were originally intended to provide scalable, decentralized, and fault-tolerant systems,
they can be exploited as a weakness in order to launch EAs. We mainly account the following two
reasons for that:
1. Partial knowledge - each peer has only partial knowledge of the overlay network due to the
routing table structure and its capacity. This allows for scalability and a moderate maintenance
overhead. As a consequence, peers do rely on other peers when requesting routing table entries.
2. Deterministic behavior - to promote timeliness and scalability, several fundamental P2P protocol
operations are subject to a deterministic behavior. Consequently, attackers are able to identify
hotspots for attacks with very high chance.
We narrow the technical focus of this thesis to the localized EA susceptibility of structured P2P
protocols, which are also referred to as distributed hash tables (DHT); a protocol class that is usually
applied for data discovery services. In particular, a manifestation of the two previously described
weakness reasons is the lookup mechanism in DHTs which happens to be a frequently used secu-
rity exploit. Lookups are required to resolve contact information of other peers prior to message
exchanges. Maliciously acting peers that intercept such lookup messages are consequently able to
inject malicious information in the overlay network and thereby launch an EA. Moreover, lookups
unveil a deterministic behavior which manifests itself in convergence towards a destination peer. In
other words, queries are sent on each lookup algorithm iteration to peers closer to the destination
peer. Consequently, specific hotspots in the overlay graph can be discovered which allow for highly
efficient lookup message interception. We will refer to localized EAs that exploit such hotspots as
topology-aware localized Eclipse attacks (taLEA).
In this thesis, we seek for a taLEA assessment and mitigation. The latter should retain P2P protocol
features to allow its application for many scenarios.
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions
Given the high efficiency of taLEAs and P2P’s dispersion in various important application domains,
we have formulated the following two research questions that steer the research presented in this
thesis:
• (R1) - What is the impact of taLEAs?
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• (R2) - Is there a taLEA mitigation technique that does not sacrifice P2P’s benefits?
Given the lack of a systematic discourse or models covering security issues in P2P systems, the the-
sis developed the background contribution (C0) of a detailed taxonomic security survey. Moreover,
we address the previous two research questions by three substantial technical contributions to the
P2P security research community.
• (C0) - P2P taxonomic security survey.
• (C1) - Assessment of taLEA impact.
• (C2) - taLEA mitigation with divergent lookups using random walks.
• (C3) - P2P address space slicing strategy to improve divergent lookup efficiency over random
walks.
The contributions in this thesis provide answers to our previously stated research questions. Our
first technical contribution (C1) discusses the taLEA, which is central part of our investigations, in
the context of three different P2P protocols, i.e., Chord [SMLN+03], Pastry [RD01], and Kadem-
lia [MM02]. We highlight the severity and efficiency of taLEAs and furthermore come up with base-
line measurements. These allow to compare the reliability with and without our mitigation technique
which is presented as second contribution (C2). The technique proposes our novel divergent lookup
approach. This approach lacks deterministic behavior as opposed to the lookup mechanisms that
is typically found in structured P2P protocols. Therefore, it is harder to intercept divergent lookup
calls as opposed to convergent ones. In contrast to several mitigations for P2P attacks, our approach
of divergent lookups supports scalable, fully decentralized, and anonymous operation. Also, our
approach does not require additional infrastructures to certify the benignity of lookup results. Con-
tribution (C3) provides an optimization over the random walk approach proposed in (C2) through
a novel technique called P2P address space slicing. We have validated divergent lookups in a com-
prehensive, realistic simulation case study and were able to mitigate taLEAs on average for 95% to
100% of the cases.
1.3 Publications
This thesis is based upon the following articles:
• Daniel Germanus, Hatem Ismail, and Neeraj Suri, PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework
for P2P Attack Mitigation, submitted to the 34th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Sys-
tems (SRDS), 2015
• Daniel Germanus and Neeraj Suri, Security Aspects of Peer-to-Peer Protocols, submitted to ACM
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 2015
• Daniel Germanus, Stefanie Roos, Thorsten Strufe, and Neeraj Suri, Mitigating Eclipse Attacks in
Peer-to-Peer Networks, in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications and Network
Security, San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 400–408, 2014
• Daniel Germanus, Robert Langenberg, Abdelmajid Khelil, and Neeraj Suri, Susceptibility Anal-
ysis of Structured P2P Systems to Localized Eclipse Attacks, in Proceedings of the 31st IEEE Sym-
posium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), Irvine, CA, USA, pp. 11–20, 2012
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Besides the previously listed articles, the author has published articles related to critical informa-
tion infrastructure protection and how P2P protocols may increasing the resilience of Smart Grid
applications. These articles are related to but not in the focus of this thesis. The author’s full publi-
cation record can be found in Chapter 7.
1.4 Thesis Structure
We provide at first a detailed overview of P2P security aspects, attacks, and mitigation techniques
(Chapter 2) as contribution (C0). Then, we further detail a structured P2P protocol system model
alongside with our attack model (Chapter 3). Subsequently, a baseline evaluation is conducted us-
ing heuristics and experiments in Chapter 4 which corresponds to our first technical contribution.
Afterwards, we present the mitigation technique in Chapter 5 as our second and third technical con-
tribution. The thesis concludes with a summary, conclusion, and future work provided in Chapter 6.
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2 P2P Security Survey
This chapter refers to contribution (C0) of this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols are a specific variant of distributed systems. Their popularity is driven
by characteristic P2P features of scalability, decentralization, and cost. Scalability implies that
no changes to the protocol design are demanded with increasing amounts of peers. Whereas a
client/server computing architecture demands increasing back-end resources with increasing num-
bers of requests, this is not the case for P2P due to its by-design decentralized architecture. Fur-
thermore, the decentralized P2P system designs promote inherent resilience against individual peer
failures. The peer population itself represents the service provisioning infrastructure of the sys-
tem. Thereby, potential service consumers are required to partake in resource provisioning making
the need for dedicated datacenters void. Over the past decade, a multitude of P2P protocols have
emerged. Regardless of their specifics, they usually combine the following five principles: (i) symme-
try of interfaces as peers take coincident duties of servers and clients, (ii) resilience to perturbations
in the underlying network substrate and to peer failures, (iii) data and service survivability through
replication schemes, (iv) usage of peer resources at the network’s edge, imposing potentially low
infrastructure costs and fostering scalability as well as decentralization, and (v) address variance of
resource provisioning among peers.
These five principles make P2P a vital foundation for a diverse set of applications. Originally,
P2P was (in)famous for filesharing, but nowadays it can be found in social networks, multimedia
content distribution, online games, Internet telephony services, instant messaging, the Internet of
Things, Car-to-Car communication, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and
wide area monitoring systems (WAMS), e.g., in the context of the power grid or the Smart Grid.
Some of the previously mentioned application fields are either time-critical, safety-critical, or both.
They demand dependable and secure operation to prevent hazards that may result in losses of life or
equipment. Hence, researchers and engineers should factor in three important aspects related to P2P
security:
1. P2P attacks and mitigation techniques may significantly differ from those found in the
client/server system model.
2. Many P2P attacks affect a variety of P2P protocols as a consequence of common design choices.
3. Mitigation design should not impose loss of P2P benefits.
2.1.1 Contributions
On the above introduction, the goals of this chapter are:
1. A comprehensive P2P system and application model.
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2. A comprehensive detailing of P2P protocol security issues, “attacks”, and mitigation techniques
conducted from P2P classifying viewpoints to simplify understanding the pool of related work.
3. A taxonomy analysis of the Eclipse attack (EA) susceptibility as an example case to study.
2.1.2 Survey Structure
An overview on related surveys which discuss P2P security and dependability aspects is given in
Section 2.2. Subsequently, fundamental P2P features are described alongside with a generic P2P
protocol system model in Section 2.3. The security notion used throughout this thesis is provided
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides a detailed overview on typical P2P attacks and their mitigation
algorithms, our proposed EA taxonomy, and a detailed discussion of EA mitigation techniques. In all
sections, we use the style of discussing prominent works in the subject over an introduction followed
by a retrospective discussion as applicable.
2.2 Related Surveys
Many surveys in the field of P2P security and related categories have been published. However, we
found that these only address a limited subset of the prominent aspects which are listed in Table 2.1.
We aim to close this gap with this chapter. Table 2.2 lists the relevant selected work surveyed as a
basis for our aim.
As it has partially been targeted in related work, we discuss security, attacks and dependability,
but also further aspects that include mitigation techniques, taxonomic and classification schemes.
Moreover, the scope and protocol class coverage of existing surveys is of importance for us in order
to ascertain whether the article develops a system and/or application centric view for structured,
unstructured, or hybrid P2P protocols.
2.2.1 Security Overview
Among the mostly discussed P2P protocol security mechanisms are authentication mechanisms, se-
cure storage, and secure routing. These three mechanisms allow the implementation of various
downstream mechanisms. We now link the different survey articles according to the mechanisms
they discuss. Also, the subsequent discussion of attacks refers back to selected security mechanisms.
Authentication mechanisms [RHB08, ATS04, VdPVA10] help in maintaining a benign peer popula-
tion and provide the technical basis for downstream mechanisms such as secure admission, secure
storage or secure routing. Secure storage is vital not only for data centric applications in order
to prevent attackers from illicit data modifications [DM04, UPS11, Wal03, ATS04]. In a broader
sense, illicit data modification in online games is considered as cheating [Kwo09, YK13]. Secure
routing enables communicating peers to identify message senders as well as message authentic-
ity [UPS11, Wal03, ATS04, RHB08].
The aforementioned security mechanisms increase the resilience of P2P systems against various
attacks. Some of these mechanisms are robust up to a critical mass of colluding malicious peers. Un-
fortunately, some of these require cryptography and the identification of peers. These requirements
may interfere with application requirements like anonymity, heterogeneity, or resource frugality.
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Table 2.1: Considered aspects for the related survey discussion.
Aspect Abbreviation Description
Security SEC Substantial focus on P2P security weaknesses and
threats. Articles with a parenthesized checkmark
indicate that a generic security consideration is of
marginal importance to this survey.
Attack(s) ATK Additionally to SEC, articles discuss vulnerabilities
and how they can be exploited through specific at-
tacks.
Dependability DEP Substantial focus on P2P dependability.
Mitigation MIT Complementary to SEC or DEP includes a mitigation or
countermeasure discussion.
Taxonomy TAX Technical concepts are segregated and discussed in
multiple dimensions to reduce complexity.
Classification CLS Technical concepts are classified for complexity reduc-
tion.
Terminology TERM Inconsistent terminology usage across articles is uni-
fied or aligned.
Scope SCP Scope limitation to protocol (Pro), application (App),
or middleware (MW) context (7 indicates no scope
limitation)
Protocol class PRO Which protocol classes are part of the discussion (S:
structured, U: unstructured, H: hybrid)
Table 2.2: Aspect coverage of related surveys.
Citation SEC ATK DEP MIT TAX CLS TRM SCP PRO
[Wal03] 3 3 7 3 7 7 7 Pro S
[ATS04] 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 S,U
[DM04] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 S,U
[LCP+05] (3) 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 S,U
[RHB08] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 S,U,H
[Kwo09] 3 3 7 3 7 3 3 App S,U,H
[VdPVA10] 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 S,U,H
[UPS11] 3 3 7 3 7 7 7 Pro S
[Pas12] (3) 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 S,U,H
[GIP+13] 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 S,U,H
[KT13] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 MW S,U
[KKHY13] (3) 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 S,U,H
[LMJV13] (3) 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 S,U,H
[YK13] 3 7 3 3 7 3 7 App S,U,H
This paper 3 3 (3) 3 3 3 3 7 S,U,H
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2.2.2 Attack Overview
Attacks against P2P systems usually show an impact in terms of the system’s availability, integrity,
or confidentiality. Several of the attacks are known from other system architectures, such as
client/server, others are completely new or composed of various attacks. We highlight now the
different attacks along with the corresponding articles that provide a discussion of them.
Denial of service attacks degrade or prevent a system from correct service delivery [DM04,
VdPVA10]. The more sophisticated Sybil attack [UPS11, VdPVA10, Kwo09] can be used as a po-
tential precursor for an Eclipse attack [UPS11, VdPVA10].
If either secure storage, secure routing, or authentication mechanisms cannot be provided, a set of
attacks including omission, content forgery, content pollution, censorship, or routing table poisoning
may be the consequence [VdPVA10, Kwo09].
Churn denotes the effect of joining and leaving peers in an overlay. Churn attacks consider arti-
ficially induced churn with potentially high rates to cause bandwidth consumption due to overlay
maintenance. This leads in the worst case to denial of service or its degradation [Kwo09].
Different cheating attack strategies exist for massive multiplayer online games (MMOG) which are
built on top of a P2P system architecture [Kwo09, YK13].
The adversarial collusion of malicious peers is a key factor to launch the aforementioned attacks
with a significant impact. In many cases, inherent P2P design choices which foster scalability and
fault tolerance are exploited.
2.2.3 Dependability Overview
Usually, P2P protocols are resilient to dynamic behavior such as random peer failures. Scalability is
also provided by many P2P protocols, i.e., efficient overlay operation is maintained while the peer
population grows. In this subsection, these dependability strengthening features are linked to the
articles that discuss them.
Replication is a common technique to achieve fault tolerance for data storage [DM04, YK13,
Pas12]. Robust content discovery, search algorithms, and lookup mechanisms address fault tol-
erance [DM04, KT13, Pas12]. Also, consistency and persistence address fault tolerance and are
dedicatedly discussed in [YK13].
Scalability is an essential feature for large-scale dependable systems, especially when their de-
sign targets openness to new participants and the amount of participants is unknown during design
and deploy time. To this end, overlay maintenance, searches and lookups are required to be effi-
cient [DM04, LMJV13, KT13, YK13].
Furthermore, robust routing mechanisms address overlay resilience to failing peers; this can be
achieved, for example, by independent paths, multiple overlay dimensions [DM04], or robust topol-
ogy creation [LMJV13].
Those features are well established and provide for good robustness against non-malicious faults.
Partly, they provide basic attack resilience but only up to a critical partition size of colluding malicious
peers.
2.2.4 Mitigation Overview
Following this synopsis on common P2P security and attack issues, we now present an overview
of mitigation techniques. These address either protocol design weaknesses or specific attacks.
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The hardening of protocol extensions has been proposed to replace features which reveal design
weaknesses [UPS11]. Furthermore, partitioning resilient topologies, robust routing, and monitoring
schemes to check for routing table consistency and peer protocol compliance exist [VdPVA10, Wal03].
Incentive mechanisms to penalize misbehaving peers or so called free-riders have been pro-
posed [ATS04, Kwo09, YK13]. Moreover, cheaters in MMOG can be detected, prevented and pe-
nalized [YK13].
While these mitigation techniques increase the resilience to specific attacks, they naturally come at
a cost. Computation cycles and bandwidth consumption are required to support mitigation, also some
techniques require to access external infrastructures or to append additional hardware resources to
the overlay.
2.2.5 Taxonomy Overview
In the context of security related P2P surveys, existing taxonomies address P2P protocol compar-
isons [LCP+05, RHB08] as well as resource and data structures [RHB08]. While this supports the
selection process of a suitable P2P design scheme for given requirements, those taxonomies fail to
address security considerations.
A taxonomy allows us to segregate a technical concept across specified dimensions. Eventually, di-
mensions can be augmented with numerical scales to allow for quantitative comparisons of different
problem instances. This allows to compare different specific instances – attacks in our case – with
each other. This also helps to conduct mitigation planning based on attack severity estimations.
2.2.6 Classification and Terminology Overview
Often, P2P protocols are classified in a scheme to compare across application domains and features
such as scalability, fault tolerance, or security [DM04, ATS04].
Moreover, a security goal oriented protocol classification based on a data/control centric applica-
tion differentiation is given in [VdPVA10].
A classification of resource discovery mechanisms is provided in [LMJV13], and a traffic classifica-
tion scheme either on packet or flow level is discussed in [GIP+13].
Furthermore, group management mechanisms are classified in [KKHY13] based on generic admis-
sion/maintenance, indexing, and resource discovery aspects.
Cheating categories in MMOGs are classified in [YK13], closely related reputation management
techniques are presented in [ATS04, Kwo09] as well as incentive mechanisms like payments or auc-
tions [Kwo09].
A unified terminology for game theoretic modeling of data provisioning and retrieval in overlay
networks is given in [Kwo09].
Overall, a classification allows for aspect oriented comparisons, e.g., to outline different articles
that use a specific hardening or mitigation technique. Similarly, a unified terminology is helpful. For
instance, when different groups of authors have published work about the same or a closely related
topic but use differing or even contradicting terminology. A simple approach to achieve terminology
unification is to put different articles on top of a common system model, and then subsequently
discuss notions alongside with a mapping between different terminology uses if necessary.
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2.2.7 Summary & Research Gap
Table 2.2 provides an overview of related survey articles and their aspect coverage. We criticize
that multiple presented aspects should be discussed in an interlinked manner, e.g., articles about
security issues that may need to consider dependability aspects lack insights about protocol inherent
defense mechanisms and how they cater for resilience as well. Furthermore, surveys usually discuss
a multitude (or few groups) of closely related articles, in such cases classification, terminology, or
taxonomy schemes are strongly recommended and unfortunately missing in many places.
We aim to close such gaps of incompletely covered technical aspects. To this end, we provide a
classifying overview on P2P security weaknesses, attacks, and mitigations. The classification reveals
relationships between different weakness and attack classes in regard to the affected security goals.
Moreover, we provide a taxonomy for the class of Eclipse Attacks (EA). We have picked EA as it
affects all three security goals (i.e., availability, integrity, confidentiality), is a combination of various
attacks, and multiple variants are possible.
From a methodological viewpoint, we want to stimulate security researchers to pursue a holis-
tic approach in order to provide a full coverage of related technical aspects, highlight coher-
ences/commonalities/differences in specific fields, and also show new directions.
2.3 P2P Systems
The P2P computing paradigm may refer to the networking or the computational/storage aspect of a
distributed system. P2P exploits resources at the edge of the network, i.e., there are no dedicated
data centers but participants are instead required to share their resources.
This fosters a design with no or few data warehouses and enables low profit or non-commercial
organizations an architectural stepping stone to develop large-scale applications. For example, large
file downloads in the open source community are nowadays offered through P2P distribution as well
to financially distribute their infrastructure cost which is driven by direct downloads. Other examples
are contemporary instant messaging and video telephony applications, most of them are – except
their authentication and billing services – based upon fully decentralized P2P technology. Moreover,
distribution and decentralization improve the data survivability and provide a basis for fault tolerance
in terms of both the communication and computation capabilities. Another common P2P feature is
scalability, which refers to maintaining growing and shrinking systems without requiring inherent
changes to the system’s design.
In the following, we provide an overview of different P2P systems categories.
2.3.1 P2P Application Categories
We consider two leading dimensions for the classification of P2P based applications, namely intent
and extent. The intent defines the major goal of the application, i.e., data dissemination or data dis-
covery. The extent, on the other hand, describes the amount and emergence of data the application is
dealing with. The two main extent classes are control-centric applications and data-centric applica-
tions. We provide an overview of the different combinations of intents and extents in Table 2.3. Data
dissemination focuses on fast provision of contents to a large amount of consuming peers. In contrast
to dissemination, data discovery is addressing the persistent and survivable storage of data or point-
ers to data. For example, control-centric data discovery applications include P2P messaging with
small message sizes in aperiodic intervals. On the other hand, control-centric data dissemination
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applications exchange messages, e.g., using a periodic scheme with lower messaging frequencies.
Quite different, data-centric data discovery applications show an aperiodic messaging behavior with
comparably small message overhead opposed to data-centric data dissemination applications. We
provide further examples in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: P2P application dimensions.
Intent Extent Example
data dissemination control-centric Crititical information infrastructures, e.g., SmartGrid
data dissemination data-centric streaming media, e.g. P2PTV
data discovery control-centric maintenance, e.g., JXTA searching/resolver services
data discovery data-centric indexing in DHTs, e.g. BitTorrent
2.3.2 P2P Protocol Categories
The two major P2P protocol designs are unstructured and structured protocols, and they correlate
with the application categories that have been introduced in the previous section, i.e., unstructured
protocols are mostly suitable for data dissemination, whereas structured ones are usually applied
for data discovery. Hybrid protocol designs combine aspects from unstructured and structured ones
within one system.
Moreover, hierarchical systems partly contradict the P2P principle that all peers are equal in the
sense of service provision. These systems can be considered layered, e.g., for two layers as a compos-
ite overlay consisting of front-end and back-end peers.
The next subsection provides a generic technical overview on P2P protocols and subsequent subsec-
tions detail the aforementioned P2P protocol categories in regard of the overlay topology, resources
discovery, and message passing.
Generic P2P Protocol Description
The basic building blocks for a P2P overlay network are join/leave operations, maintenance, and
message exchange among peers. The P2P application layer usually builds its implementation upon
these few basic features.
In order to be part of an overlay network, a join (or bootstrapping) operation is required. Explicitly
joining the overlay allows peers to (i) announce their presence and (ii) initially receive information
about other peers on the overlay and global configuration parameters. Peers maintain a specific
identifier which is valid for the overlay network in order to decouple from lower layer identifier
schemes such as an IP address.
Typically, several protocols implement a leave operation which allows peers to announce their
intention to quit the overlay network ahead in time of the actual disconnection. This allows peers in
the overlay to reassign resources, possibly copy data from the leaving peer and to remove its contact
information from routing tables.
Contact information about peers is usally stored in contact lists (also neighbor lists or routing tables)
on each peer. Contact information consists of a tuple of the overlay identifier or key and the corre-
sponding underlay network address, e.g., IP address and port number. Overlay identifiers are often
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a 128 or 160 bit string. They may be arbitrarily chosen or computed from a feature of the peer, e.g.,
IP address, MAC address, inventory or serial number.
The topology of a P2P overlay network is defined as a directed graph D = (P, E) where peers are
represented by the graph’s vertices p ∈ P. Moreover, p’s contact information about other peers
o ∈ P \ {p} is represented by edges (p, o) ∈ E on the topology graph.
Recurrently running tasks are part of the maintenance operation. This includes the activity to ping
peers from the contact list in order to check for their liveliness and the removal of unresponsive peers’
contact information. Also, peers might propagate contact information of known peers to specific peer
subsets on the overlay such as replica groups.
Moreover, peers require a message passing mechanism for any interaction among them. Therefore,
peers implement a send and a receive operation. The following two subsections present the different
technical approaches for structured and unstructured protocols.
2.3.3 Unstructured P2P Protocols
Representatives of the unstructured P2P protocol class [Rip01, CRB+03, GKSS13] are mainly used
for data dissemination applications. Their topology is usually embedded within the physical underlay
network topology and unveils often tree or mesh like subgraphs which allow for low latency message
exchange, e.g., to address timeliness requirements of data dissemination applications. Tree topologies
can be found, e.g., in single source streaming media data dissemination with various consumers as
leave nodes. Meshes are the more generic case, e.g., in applications with multiple sources and sinks.
Unstructured P2P protocols usually search for resources (i.e., peers and data) and, in contrast to
structured protocols, do not use an addressing scheme. Peers nevertheless maintain an identifier
to allow independence of the underlay network address. Resources are discovered using search
algorithms on the overlay graph. Examples for search algorithms are breadth-first search, depth-first
search, random walks, or expanding ring searches. These can be varied according to application
requirements.
Message passing may be direct, i.e., using an underlay network connection between two peers, but
this usually requires that peers know each other upfront. In case the destination peer for a message
is unknown, it may be piggybacked with a resource discovery operation.
Peers maintain lists with contact information about other peers. Hence messaging works efficiently
and the network does not suffocate from search messages. The efficiency of such lists depends on the
peers’ liveliness. Therefore, stored peers are pinged periodically and removed in case no ping reply
is received.
2.3.4 Structured P2P Protocols
Structured P2P protocols [SMLN+03, RD01, ZHS+04, MM02] are mostly applied for data discovery
applications. Their topology graphs usually show small-world properties, i.e., there exists a path
between any two peers with a relatively small amount of edges. Structured topologies appear as
ring structures with crosslinks, which form a basis for scalability and efficient operations like re-
source discovery and message passing. Some protocols unveil more exotic topologies, e.g., butterfly
graphs [MNR02], or a multi-torus [RFH+01].
In structured P2P protocols, pointers to resources (peers or data) are stored in a distributed data
structure called distributed hash table. The overlay’s address space is usually an integer scale in the
range of [0, . . . , 2w − 1] with key length w being 128 or 160 in general. Usually, a distance function
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d(a, b) is defined which allows distance computations between any two identifiers a and b in the
address space. Distance computations are crucial for the lookup mechanism and data storage re-
sponsibilities. The distance function and its properties differ among protocol implementations. Data
discovery is realized by computing the key of an easy-to-grasp resource identifier like a given name
and subsequently requesting that key and the data associated to this key from one of the responsible
peers.
Messages – e.g. to request the data for a given key – are exchanged in most structured protocols
directly, i.e., using an underlay network connection between two peers. If peers do not know each
other, no direct connection can be set up and the destination peer needs to be resolved at first. To
this end, an overlay lookup mechanism exists, which aims to steadily decrease the address space
distance towards the destination on each iteration of the lookup algorithm until the identifier could
be resolved. This design approach turns out to be very efficient and promotes scalability. Once
the lookup has retrieved the destination’s underlay network address, messages can be exchanged.
Lookup variants include iterative or recursive algorithms as well as parallelized queries to a set of
several closest peers each time.
Routing tables usually store k · w entries with k being a protocol specific constant. Moreover, for
the i-th portion of k entries with i ∈ [0 . . .w], the peer stores contact information of peers that share i
common prefix bits of the peers’ key. In other words, routing tables usually provide more storage for
closer peers than more distant ones. Also, routing tables should keep only information about live and
reachable peers, which is why peers are periodically pinged. In structured protocols, maintenance is
more expensive as the topological structure needs to be retained, e.g., newly joined peers have to be
put in appropriate peer’s routing tables and leaving/unresponsive peers have to be replaced by live
ones in many peers’ routing tables.
2.3.5 Hybrid P2P Protocols
Hybrid variants of P2P protocols integrate unstructured and structured aspects, as their intent is
focusing on data discovery and data dissemination. A prominent hybrid protocol example is BitTor-
rent [Bit08]. It was originally an unstructured protocol but has been extended with structured P2P
features to provide a fully decentralized data discovery mechanism. Consequently, BitTorrent could
abandon the concept of so called tracker servers in favor of the newly integrated decentralized data
discovery features to improve the system’s availability.
2.3.6 Hierarchical P2P Protocols
Usually, peers in a P2P system are considered equal in terms of the service they provide. Yet, for some
application cases, it turned out that a hierarchical P2P design can be advantageous. In hierarchical
designs, peers are categorized. Categories can be based on their bandwidth, latency, storage, or
computation cycles provisioning. Also, to address churn effects, the (expected) peer online time may
function as a categorization measure. Usually, the category with fewer peers represents the back-end
part of the hierarchical system, whereas the multitude of peers act as front-end peers which process
service requests at the first level and only forward requests to the back-end, in case they cannot fulfill
the service request in the first place. This design has proven successful, for example, in the eDonkey
file sharing system.
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2.4 On the Attackability of P2P-based Distributed Systems
We now describe security goals that are well established in the literature and discuss the assets
of a P2P system. After introducing these basic notions, we discuss different attack categories and
relate them to the affected security goals and assets. This helps the reader to define security goal
requirements for the system assets in specific application cases, assess risks stemming from attacks,
and to plan mitigations.
We emphasize that our focus is limited on attacks against P2P systems and do not consider attacks
that are prepared or conducted using P2P systems in order to harm non-P2P systems.
2.4.1 Security Goals
We refer to the established security notion of [ALRL04] for availability, integrity and confidentiality
as defined below. Whenever a definition refers to authentication, we assume that peers are implicitly
authenticated after joining the overlay network. P2P protocols may be extended using admission
control systems or are completely open for arbitrary peers. The three security goals are defined as
follows:
1. Availability: readiness for correct service of authenticated peers.
2. Integrity: absence of unauthorized system alterations.
3. Confidentiality: absence of unauthorized disclosure of information.
These fundamental goals help to classify the target and impact of P2P attacks.
2.4.2 Assets
Assets are abstractions from technical concepts of the system which have to be protected in regard of
the previously defined security goals, in order to maintain a secure system. We consider two types of
assets in P2P systems, namely:
1. Operations (Op) accessible through the service interface of the P2P protocol. These assets are
accessible on network level.
2. Data structures (DS), e.g., data stored in a peer’s routing table or resources that are shared with
other peers of the overlay network. These assets may be accessible at network level or locally
on the peer’s host machine.
We will refer to these two assets (Op and DS) in the following subsection where we discuss different
P2P attacks. Table 2.4 provides a comprehensive overview that relates attacks to security goals and
assets.
2.4.3 Attacks
We now present the different attacks that are specific to P2P systems. Besides the (distributed) denial
of service attacks, which are well known from client/server system architectures and apply to P2P as
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well, most attacks exploit fundamental P2P features such as decentralization and the partial view on
the system of each peer. Consequently, attacks aim at tricking other peers by provision of incorrect
data, e.g., to mislead peers in terms of routing. Moreover, attackers could take an advantage in
terms of own or others’ resource provisioning, overcome limitations in voting systems or games, or
selectively hide information in the overlay.
• Denial of service attacks (DoS) [ALRL04], distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), or dis-
ruption attacks [WZR08] are well known from system architectures other than P2P, e.g.,
client/server computing. In the case of P2P architectures, the attacker aims to decrease the
overlay network’s service availability by excessively sending messages to a specific set of peers
and thereby negatively affect the Op asset. This could affect the join/leave mechanism, or ar-
bitrary other service aspects, e.g., put/get operations in a DHT. For example, benign peers may
be impaired by an excessive maintenance workload. Moreover, DoS and DDoS attacks have a
negative impact on bandwidth usage and resource provisioning which may result in degraded
service provision.
• Pollution attacks [SSNRR10, BdAMNCdSBV13] or index poisoning [LNR06] aims at the P2P
system’s integrity and its DS asset by adding incorrect information to the P2P system. Con-
sequences of pollution attacks are the proliferation of polluted content resulting in service
impairments.
• White washing [BdAMNCdSBV13, CLB09] or censorship attacks aim at the availability or in-
tegrity of P2P systems. This includes either illicit changing of, deletion of, or denying access to
data. Thereby, these attacks endanger the DS asset.
• Collusion attacks aim at the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of P2P networks. Collu-
sion refers to the fact that a sufficiently large subset of peers colludes to carry out a strategy
which targets at the P2P network’s services and thereby negatively affects the Op asset. Usually
this is done to override controlling mechanisms, e.g., for reputation or trust management, or
bandwidth provisioning.
• Routing attacks aim at compromising the availability or integrity of P2P networks. Routing
attacks play an important role in composite attacks, such as the Eclipse attack. In routing
attacks, a malicious peer undermines the message passing mechanism, e.g., by dropping or
delaying messages. Another routing attack variant is routing table poisoning [NR06]. In this
attack, an attacker deliberately modifies its own or other peers’ routing tables, e.g., by returning
bogus information to benign peers’ lookup requests. Attraction and repulsion [WZR08] are
specific variants of routing attacks which either increase (attraction) or decrease (repulsion) the
attractiveness of peers, e.g., during path selection or routing table maintenance tasks. These
attacks negatively affect the DS asset.
• Sybil attacks [Dou02] aim at the availability or confidentiality of P2P networks and can be
regarded as a specific version of node/peer insertion attacks. They consider the insertion of
peers into the overlay which are controlled by a colluding adversarial party or a single adversary.
This could happen at specific or arbitrary locations on the overlay’s topology, depending on the
attacker’s aim. Furthermore, P2P applications may consider system users as legal entities and
consequently restrict the amount of peers per user to the amount of allowed votes for that
entity. Hence, a disbalance is brought to the system in terms of expected amount of peers
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Table 2.4: P2P attacks combined with harmed security goals and assets.
Attack Availability Integrity ConfidentialityAssets
DoS/DDoS 3 7 7 Op
Pollution 7 3 7 DS
White washing & cen-
sorship
3 3 7 DS
Collusion 3 3 3 Op
Routing 3 3 7 DS
Sybil 3 7 3 Op
Buffer map cheating 3 3 7 Op
Eclipse 3 3 3 DS, Op
per user. Sybil attacks may be a precursor for many of the previously described attacks. Sybil
attacks affect the Op asset of the system.
• Buffer map cheating attacks [LWC09] aim to decrease the availability of P2P networks. Through
this attack, the adversary reduces the outgoing traffic load of his peer(s) by lying about its
data provisioning which is also an integrity infringement and affects the Op system asset. This
attack is especially applied to streaming media P2P applications which rely on the collaboration
of peers.
• Eclipse attacks [SNDW06, GRSS14] aim to decrease the availability, integrity, and confidential-
ity of P2P networks. These are composite attacks that may involve routing table poisoning,
DoS/DDoS, Sybil attacks, collusion, white washing, or censorship. Consequently, these attacks
have an impact on both system assets. Due to the large problem space created by this attack,
we propose a unified terminology and taxonomy in Section 2.5.
Summary
The presented attacks consider modifications of the P2P system to either impair or abuse system ser-
vices. The difference to comparable attacks in client/server system architectures is that P2P overlay
networks may grow very large and adversaries have to adapt their efforts as well, i.e., scale the ma-
licious peer fraction accordingly, thereby requiring a substantial amount of coordination to be done
for sophisticated collusion strategies. Nevertheless, attacks vary a lot from client/server architectures
in a sense that an attacker has probably no physical or local network access to the resources to be
attacked. Therefore, malicious peers need for example proper announcement in the overlay network
before they may launch their adversarial behavior. This results occasionally in complex attack pat-
terns with plenty of variations to achieve the adversarial goal. We provide an in-depth exposition
on different varieties of the Eclipse attack in the subsequent section in order to draw the reader’s
attention to the complexity of P2P attacks.
2.5 Eclipse Attacks - Definition & Taxonomy
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the Eclipse attack (EA), which is hard to detect
due to its sophisticated behavior. It affects all three security goals and also both system assets. To
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this end, we provide a concise description of the attack, discuss three prominent EA variants as
well as detailed attack mechanics of the attack’s different phases. We highlight the complexity by
providing a taxonomy which characterizes different attack configurations as well as requirements on
the adversary. We close this section with an overview of the related work in the EA field with special
focus on the mitigation techniques.
2.5.1 Definition
The goal of an EA adversary is to eclipse one or more victim peers, i.e., to obstruct the victim’s service
provision by preventing benign peers from delivering their service requests to the victims. Basically,
an EA consists of two phases: firstly, the placement of malicious resources in the overlay network
in conjunction with routing table poisoning and, secondly, the adversarial actions carried out on
intercepted messages. We use the following terminology to describe the different types of peers in
an overlay under an EA. Benign peers b ∈ B, malicious peers m ∈ M , and victim peers v ∈ V , with
B ∪M ∪ V = P, B ∩M = ;, B ∩ V = ;, and M ∩ V = ;.
Furthermore, we differentiate three EA types:
1. Generic EAs – malicious peers are scattered over the overlay network, and every non-malicious
peer is considered as a victim, i.e., V = P \M . The overlay is attacked in its entirety.
2. Localized EAs (LEA) – malicious peers are scattered over the overlay network and the amount
of victim peers is significantly smaller compared to the total amount of peers on the overlay,
i.e., |V |  |P|. A LEA targets the service provision of a specific peer subset only.
3. Topology-aware LEAs (taLEA) – malicious peers are located at specific topology locations. Con-
sequently, less malicious peers are required than for the LEA case, i.e., |V | < |M |  |P|. There-
fore, a taLEA might be favored by adversaries for long-term attacks.
Examples for the EA, LEA, and taLEA in a structured overlay’s address space are given in Figures 2.1
through 2.3. In these examples, the address space is assumed to be a one-dimensional scale, and
peers are mapped to unique identifiers on that scale. Malicious peers mi are illustrated by red circles
with the victim selection shown in square brackets. The asterisk in Figure 2.1 represents a generic
selection, in contrast to Figure 2.2 where the victim selection contains only peer v , which corresponds
to a LEA scenario. Moreover, Figure 2.3 shows a taLEA in which the topology awareness consists of
placing malicious peers as direct neighbors of the victim peer. A taLEA usually requires a small and
constant amount of malicious peers. For LEAs, on the other hand, previous studies suggest that
malicious resources in the range of 10% to 20% are required.
In the next subsection, we describe techniques to launch EAs.
a
m1
[*]
d e v f g
m2
[*]
m3
[*]
Figure 2.1: Generic EA, malicious peers mi attack any benign peer.
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m1
[v]
d e v f g
m2
[v]
m3
[v]
Figure 2.2: LEA, malicious peers mi attack peers v ∈ V only.
a db c v hg
m1
[v]
m2
[v]
Figure 2.3: taLEA, malicious peers mi attack peers v ∈ V only, and make use of topology to decrease|M | in contrast to the LEA scenario.
2.5.2 EA Phase 1 - Activation of Malicious Peers and Routing Table Poisoning
In order to create a malicious peer fraction, an attacker could take over existing benign peers and
change their behavior from benign to malicious. Another possibility is the introduction of new ma-
licious peers, which could be joined in the overlay network, either at arbitrary locations or, in the
case of a taLEA, at specific locations in the overlay topology. In order to prevent victim peers from
servicing requests, malicious peers need to get hold of request messages. As most P2P protocols make
use of direct communication between mutually known peers, the sole introduction of malicious re-
sources is insufficient for launching an EA. Peers are mutually known in case they have stored contact
information of each other in their contact lists or routing tables (cf. Section 2.3). For the activation
of an EA, the contact information of malicious peers is propagated among the benign peer population
instead of the victim peers’ correct underlay network addresses. In order to achieve this, a routing
table poisoning (RTP) attack is conducted, thereby violating the integrity of benign peers’ routing
tables. Consequently, benign peers that make use of poisoned contact information are sending their
request messages unknowingly to a malicious peer instead of the benign destination. This is also
referred to as a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack. Contact information is usually retrieved using the
lookup mechanism in structured protocols and via searching in unstructured protocols. The following
examples discuss benign and malicious lookup cases.
Benign Lookup Case
For the benign lookup depicted in Figure 2.4, we assume peer a has no contact information about
peer v in its routing table and initiates a lookup in order to resolve v ’s contact information. A
common lookup mechanism design pattern is to send the lookup request to a known peer closest to
the destination. We assume a knows b and sends a lookup request message “v?“. As b cannot resolve
v , it forwards a’s request to c, which is closer to v and able to resolve v . Finally, c returns contact
information “v !“ to a. The dashed pointer depicts a’s communication with v , though this is not part
of the lookup process.
Malicious Lookup Case
Besides benign peers, Figure 2.5 also shows two malicious peers m1 and m2. During a’s lookup re-
quest for the destination v , peer m1 is being queried as well and returns wrong contact information
to a, i.e., m1 states that v has the underlay network address of m2. Consequently, a’s routing table
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gets poisoned and a initiates communication with m2 instead of v (dashed pointer, not part of the
lookup process).
Note that wrong contact information may also be propagated through benign peers which were poi-
soned beforehand. Once the routing tables are poisoned and malicious peers start receiving messages
intended for other peers, the EA is initiated. Due to RTP, EAs threaten both assets, i.e., operations
and data structures, in regard of the integrity security goal. Various adversarial actions are discussed
in the next subsection.
Summary
The first EA phase describes how malicious resources become known in the overlay as a prerequisite
for partaking in an EA. In contemporary structured P2P protocols, this is achieved by attacking the
lookup mechanism, which is required for maintaining the peers’ routing tables.
a cb v
v? v?
v!
Figure 2.4: Overlay lookup, benign case.
a
m1
[v]
b v
v? v?
m2
[v]
v=m2
Figure 2.5: Overlay lookup, malicious case.
2.5.3 EA Phase 2 - Carrying out Adversarial Actions
As a consequence from routing table poisoning, malicious peers may take diverse actions. Malicious
peers mi are receiving messages instead of the legitimate victim peers. Then, mi may launch ma-
licious actions for each illegitimately received message. A straight forward action is service denial,
which threatens the operations asset in terms of the availability security goal.
Malicious actions may also require to send reply messages to the benign requesters. These replies
may be of the following types: correct, modified, or forged. A reply message is correct if it is subject
to benign protocol behavior, whereas information has been deliberately changed by the attacker in
a modified message. Finally, forged messages are synthetically created and sent; these are messages
which do not correspond to a message in the benign case. In some cases, request message inspection
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is required in order to create an adequate reply message. If reply message creation does not depend
on the contents of the request message, but, e.g., requires data stored by the victim peer, the malicious
peer forwards the original request message (or a forged copy) to the eclipsed victim peer in order to
receive a legitimate reply message, which can be subsequently inspected to create a malicious reply
message.
The previously described adversarial actions complicate attack detection in contrast to comparably
simple denial of service actions.
Summary
The second EA phase describes the actual adversarial action, e.g., dropping or delaying messages.
The EA behavior may be consistent or volatile over time, and decides on detectability as well as
the collusion induced communication overhead. Clearly, we cannot discuss all potential adversarial
actions exhaustively, yet we provide a taxonomic discussion of the different aspects of EAs in the
next subsection. This taxonomy does not only help to classify a specific attack but also to plan
countermeasure development and threat analyses.
2.5.4 Eclipse Attack Taxonomy
The intention of this taxonomy is to provide a structured view on Eclipse attacks. Thereby, it system-
atically presents the causes behind an attack, an attacker’s intentions and capabilities, as well as the
actual technical approach to conduct an attack. Our structure is depicted in Figure 2.6. Each of the
tree’s nodes represents a qualitative entity. In order to facilitate a quantitative comparison, selected
nodes can be augmented with a scale system. The ascertained scale values can be aggregated in a
vector notation at each parent node and finally allow for a quantitative comparison of different EA
instances by considering the root node’s vector. Such comparisons are helpful to prioritize mitigation
planning, to estimate damage, or to assess the likelihood of an attack to occur.
Various quantitative security assessment techniques have been proposed, such as the attack surface
and its related metrics [MW11, YMR14]. Sometimes, a plain algebraic approach is unfavorable or
infeasible. In such cases, simple scale systems that propose a partial order may be sufficient, e.g.,
scale systems that assign given attribute values on an integer scale from 1 to 10 or the character-
istics high, medium, low. There exists the DREAD threat classification method [SS04] and a newer,
related approach called STRIDE method [HL09].
The taxonomy’s main categories are threat, requirements, and strategy and are described in the
following subsections.
Threat
The chance that an attacker exploits a vulnerability is called a threat to the system. It is composed
of vulnerability, assets, impact and consequences. Vulnerabilities refer to exploitable weaknesses in the
system and may enable access to assets. Once such a weakness is exploited, it has an impact on at
least one of the system’s security goals (cf. Section 2.4.1).
Assets require protection in terms of the three security goals availability, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity. The technical consequence of a threat is that the system’s service provision could turn incor-
rect. In the second place, incorrect service may lead to venue loss, suffered reputation, defamation,
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Capabilities
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Vulnerability Exploit
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Figure 2.6: EA taxonomy overview.
or safety hazards, to name but a few. In terms of P2P systems, we have identified two assets, namely
data structures and operations (cf. Section 2.4.2).
Requirements
This category describes an attacker’s objectives and knowledge.
The objective addresses application specific features in terms of the system’s services or business
processes which are tied to selected services.
In order to carry out an attack, knowledge about the system to be attacked as well as the system’s
operational context is required. Knowledge is pivotal for the attack’s efficiency, scalability, and de-
tectability. Efficiency relates to effectivity and cost, i.e., the amount of resources an attacker has to
spend to achieve a certain impact. Deeper understanding of the P2P application or protocol may
decrease attack cost because less resources are required than in a zero knowledge brute force attack
scenario. On the other hand, a cost-effective and sophisticated attack approach could be of limited
applicability to other application or protocol scenarios due to its specialization. Many P2P proto-
cols are scalable. Hence, the attack is required to scale with an increasing amount of peers in (or
requests to) the system. Again, frugality and cost effectiveness require knowledge about the proto-
col and application. Better knowledge of the protocol or application allows for attacks which are
harder to detect, e.g., an attacker could modify message payloads based on application knowledge
to bring harm over the system rather than launching a denial-of-service attack, which is straight for-
ward observable by many peers in the overlay. Besides knowing the protocol and application to be
attacked, an attacker could consider knowledge about underlying operating systems, the networking
infrastructure, and hardware of the system in order to design a specific attack.
Strategy
The strategy defines an EA’s technical modus operandi. It is essentially based upon an exploit which
materializes a threat. Furthermore, the exploit is applied to meet an attacker’s objectives by activating
undesired system behavior that unveils misuse potential.
The locality of where to apply the exploit is derived from the attacker’s objectives and knowledge.
For instance, it could be applied to all or just a subset of peers. Moreover, a peer subset does not need
to be static and could change at any time or periodically.
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Timeliness refers to the time range when the attack should be active, i.e., the starting and stopping
points. Also, in case the attack’s effectivity decays over time, e.g., due to P2P protocol maintenance
or churn, timeliness describes in which intervals the exploit needs to be reapplied.
Capabilities refer to the resource pool and accessibility features for the system. The resource pool
can vary in size over time and not all resources in the pool might be suitable for an attack. For
example, an attacker’s resource pool could include tens of thousands of networked machines, but
only a small portion of them have suitable features (e.g., IP addresses) that would be mapped to a
specific location in the address space in order to efficiently launch an attack. Accessibility features
relate to the attacker’s knowledge and include, for example, passwords or certificates to surround
perimeter protection measures.
Summary
The intention of providing this taxonomy is two-fold. Firstly, we want to motivate the reader to
comprehend and assess specific EAs in a structured way to improve on the attack understandability
and also the comparability of different EAs. Overall, this may be helpful to understand common
causes for different EA variants and to subsequently improve the P2P protocol design and remedy
the shortcomings. Augmenting the taxonomy with quantitative models for risk and impact estimation
allows, for example, to prioritize during mitigation planning.
2.6 Eclipse Attack Mitigation Techniques
We classify the existing work based on their proposed mitigation techniques. We identified five
prevalent mitigation technique classes, namely redundancy, diversity, admission, authentication &
reputation, and constraints. Now, we describe the individual classes alongside with the existing work
in each class and discuss their advantages and shortcomings. Moreover, we underline the difficulty
of designing techniques that mitigate all three previously introduced EA types (EA, LEA, and taLEA).
Table 2.5 at the end of this section gives a structured overview on the techniques and their mitigation
potential for EA variants.
2.6.1 Redundancy
Redundancy can refer to both data storage and message exchange. The works below target overlay
messaging and apply spatial redundancy to increase the resilience against peer crashes or failures in
the underlying networking infrastructure. In EA and LEA scenarios, spatial redundant messaging is
an adequate mitigation under the assumption of uniformly distributed malicious peers in the overlay
address space.
Overview on existing techniques
In [BM07] and [OC01], the authors propose overlay routing based on multiple and independent
paths in order to increase the robustness. Due to the fact that these approaches rely on convergence
across various paths or dimensions, the susceptibility to taLEAs remains, although with potentially
higher cost.
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SALSA [NW06] establishes circuits comparable to the TOR protocol [DMS04] in order to obfuscate
the requesting peer. It furthermore protects against EAs and LEAs by performing redundant lookups.
In [HK03], the authors propose wide paths for redundant message forwarding. This technique is a
suitable EA and LEA mitigation.
In [AS06], the authors propose redundant messaging and data storage to overcome EAs and LEAs.
Concluding remarks
The aforementioned techniques refer to redundant message sending to overcome failures of indi-
vidual peers. Therefore, different paths are chosen with specific requirements for the peer selection
process, e.g., to disallow duplicate peers for all paths of a given message.
These mitigation techniques are subject to the assumption that malicious resources are uniformly
distributed within the overlay network. Consequently, they show good mitigation rates for non-
topology-aware attacks (EA and LEA), have an acceptable network overhead, and promote scalability.
In order to also mitigate taLEAs by applying redundancy, the peer selection process could consider
additional requirements, such as, distances and sojourn times, to avoid malicious peers. The chal-
lenge would be to maintain a comparably good network overhead despite the additional selection
requirements.
2.6.2 Diversity
Some attacks, such as the taLEA, cannot be mitigated through existing redundant messaging ap-
proaches because the behavior of the message sending algorithm itself represents the weakness. For
such attacks, design diversity can be a suitable mitigation, i.e., using different messaging algorithms
to overcome, for example, deterministic behavior.
Overview on existing techniques
In [GRSS14], divergent lookups are proposed to mitigate taLEAs for different Kademlia protocol vari-
ants with iterative and recursive routing. Divergent lookups do not converge towards the destination
peer whose contact information should be resolved and instead declare the proximity around the
destination as a no-go area for the lookup process in order to avoid contacting malicious peers in that
area.
Concluding remarks
Diversity is a generic pattern for achieving fault-tolerant computing. The previously discussed ap-
proach focuses on algorithmic design diversity. Therefore, different algorithm implementations are
based on the same specification and combined in a framework to assess each algorithm’s result using
an acceptance test or voter mechanism. Ideally, each algorithm returns the same result; otherwise,
the acceptance test or voter has to cope with differing results in a reliable way and either needs to
repeat or proceed with the execution.
Consequently, not only benign failures but also attacks that exploit deterministic behavior in a
specific algorithm design may be mitigated with design diversity.
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In the context of EA variants, the combination of diverse designs and redundancy techniques could
provide for a comprehensive EA, LEA, and taLEA mitigation. Probably, this applies as well to other
attack classes and their variants.
A challenge in design diversity is clearly the higher cost for different implementations. Usually,
further requirements are tied to design diversity, e.g., runtime complexity and network overhead
should be similar, because voter/acceptance tests would otherwise impose a waiting time on those
algorithms with better execution times.
2.6.3 Admission
Many EA variants require a set of malicious peers to join the overlay network. To this end, mitigation
techniques have been proposed to enforce admission control during the join procedure. For example,
peers need to provide a proof for their legitimicy, e.g., by using certificates.
Overview on existing techniques
In [SENB07], Sybil attacks are launched as a preparatory step for LEAs against KAD, which is a
Kademlia-based file sharing system. The proposed mitigation makes use of a certificate authority to
enable strong encryption for the secure admission and authentication of peers.
In [ZZC+11], the authors propose a computational puzzle in the key generation process to delimit
malicious parties from choosing specific or too many keys as it may be the case in EAs, LEAs, or
taLEAs.
Concluding remarks
Admission techniques require peers to provide valid credentials during the join procedure to certify
their legitimicy.
Previously discussed works either require an additional infrastructure to verify the credentials or
apply a decentralized scheme, which mainly focuses on limiting the amount of join attempts per time
and per machine.
Depending on the amount of attacker resources, this technique may prevent malicious peers from
joining in general, delimit the amount of joining peers, or it does not mitigate at all. The latter case
may occur for a very powerful adversary that has a plethora of resources at his disposal including
appropriate credentials. Secondly, the attacker could exploit a weakness in the admission system to
bypass the limitation. Finally, the adversary could hijack peers that have already joined the overlay
network and use these for further adversarial steps.
2.6.4 Authentication & Reputation
The message exchange among peers can be secured using cryptographic methods to maintain the
integrity or confidentiality of messages and the authenticity of the sender. Furthermore, reputation
systems help peers to assess the trustworthiness of their opposites.
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Overview on existing techniques
In [CDG+02], the authors propose secure routing for P2P overlays which is an adequate mitigation
technique for EAs, LEAs, and probably also taLEAs – the latter attack case was not assessed by
the authors. Disadvantageously, this requires cryptographic primitives and a certificate authority.
Consequently, this approach neglects anonymity or openness requirements of some applications.
Shadowwalker [MB09] proposes a verification scheme that demands a certain number of peers
to confirm the identity of a peer before messages are exchanged. However, the approach has been
shown to be vulnerable to selected denial of service attacks [SDH+10].
In [LYL14], the authors propose using a decentralized quorum to decide on peers’ reputations. This
helps to mitigate EAs and has been validated for the KAD system.
Concluding remarks
Authentication systems allow for securing overlay service calls between peers by digitally signing or
encrypting messages to be exchanged. Reputation systems let a group of peers decide if a specific
peer should be allowed for service requests or if its reply should be accepted.
Consequently, an adversarial peer with the intent to eavesdrop/emit service requests or replies
would be required to obtain matching credentials, e.g., public and private cryptographic keys which
have been registered in a public-key infrastructure, as well as session keys generated among peer
groups. As in the previous discussion about admission techniques, an adversary could hijack legiti-
mate peers in order to acquire access to those credentials. Alternatively, the public key infrastructure
could be attacked as well. In any case, this requires a high proficiency level of the adversary.
These approaches require a public-key infrastructure which is a limitation for openness since po-
tential participants are required to register with the public-key infrastructure beforehand. Privacy is
limited as well since the registration might impose giving up on pseudonymity and anonymity.
2.6.5 Constraints
Selected peer features can be used to define constraints as a mitigating measure. The underlay
network address can be considered as such a feature, e.g., to avoid adversaries from using a large
range of IP addresses from the same network. Also, for overlay networks which map peers into
the address space by using hash functions, an average distance between any two peer IDs can be
assumed. In case the average distance is undershot, an ongoing localized attack can be assumed and
the given peer is excluded from routing tables. Another assumption can be made about the average
and maximum node degree in the overlay graph. Peers which unveil an unexpectedly high node
degree might be malicious since some EA variants try to attract as many messages as possible.
Overview on existing techniques
The first mention of LEAs appears as a subsidiary remark in [SNDW06]. Moreover, the authors
focus – as in their previous work [SCDR04] – on generic EAs and propose a mitigation through
degree bounding, i.e., limiting the amount of routing table entries for each peer. Adherence to this
limitation requires periodic checks using an auditing scheme. The authors conclude that degree
bounding is probably not a suitable countermeasure for LEAs or taLEAs.
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In [CKGM04], the authors propose induced churn to mitigate several attacks based on routing
table poisoning. This technique flushes routing tables in periodic intervals in order to gain fresh and
ideally benign contact information.
In [CCF09], a Sybil attack prepares a LEA against KAD to eclipse a specific address space range in
order to intercept all KAD search requests destined to the victim peer. The proposed countermeasure
aims at IP address restriction and a flooding protection scheme.
In [WTCT+08], the authors propose a backpointer hijacking method in order to launch a LEA in
the KAD network. The authors propose to mitigate this using routing table policies which disallow
peers from reclaiming the same overlay address in case they reconnect with a different IP address.
In [KLR09], two LEA variants against the KAD protocol are presented, where the first variant
resembles the approach in [SENB07, CCF09]. The second variant prevents legitimate peers from
publishing new content in the KAD file sharing system by placing malicious peers close to the legit-
imate one. Mitigations in this chapter refer to structural routing table constraints according to the
assumption that attacker resources originate from a single – or few – underlay network domains.
In [CCFD13], the authors focus on the KAD network and discuss localized attacks such as the
LEA in a publicly accessible file sharing network. They propose a reactive mitigation technique
which explores the overlay address space to determine deviations in the distribution of peers’ IDs
and thereby deduce the existence of malicious peers. The approach has been validated for the KAD
file sharing system and shows a small false-negative rate.
Concluding remarks
Constraining techniques focus on characteristics which an adversary could modify and exploit to its
advantage. Therefore, degree bounding, routing table refreshing, minimum distance between peers,
or specific underlay network characteristics have been proposed as a basis for constraints definition.
While most of these constraints can be monitored and enforced locally, i.e., without requiring mes-
sage exchange among peers or with an additional infrastructure, constraints unfortunately impose
some disadvantages, e.g., a higher network overhead, no guarantees that constraints are satisfiable,
and constraints may result in a deterministic structureness of the overlay graph that could represent
a new weakness.
2.6.6 Existing Work without EA Mitigation Proposals
In [LMSW10], the authors show the LEA susceptibility of the KAD file sharing network, which is
based on a Kademlia protocol modification. In their LEA discussions, KAD’s tolerance zone, which
can be regarded as an application level proximity concept, is populated with malicious peers. The
evaluation focuses on the attack’s impact over time.
In [GLKS12], we discuss the systematic taLEA susceptibility from an application independent view
and refer to accountable design choices of many structured P2P protocols. The authors conducted
an analytical and experimental study to underline the potentially high impact of the attack for the
Chord [SMLN+03], Pastry [RD01], and Kademlia [MM02] protocols.
2.6.7 Summary
We have identified five different mitigation technique classes, namely redundancy, diversity, admis-
sion, authentication & reputation, and constraints. These classes reduce the impact of attacks to
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the system. For example in a pro-actively manner by only admitting peers with credentials as a first
hurdle to avoid malicious peers from becoming part of the overlay network. Other classes focus on
diversity and redundancy to ensure survivability and availability of data and services in faulty or
adversarial scenarios.
As can be taken from Table 2.5, most of the related work addresses EA or LEA scenarios. An
important question is how effective the various LEA mitigation strategies are in mitigating taLEA
scenarios. The mere fact that they remain unconsidered from a model perspective in various works
does not imply ineffectiveness. On the other hand, a reassessment regarding the efficiency of LEA
mitigation techniques for taLEA scenarios would be helpful.
After all, a comprehensive mitigation of all introduced EA variants would require a combination of
various mitigation techniques.
Table 2.5: Related work in regard of attack coverage and mitigation technique class.
Citation EA LEA taLEA Mitigation Class
[OC01] 3 3 7 Redundancy
[CDG+02] 3 3 7 Authentication
[HK03] 3 3 7 Redundancy
[CKGM04] 3 7 7 Constraints
[SCDR04] 3 3 7 Constraints
[AS06] 3 3 7 Redundancy
[NW06] 3 3 7 Redundancy
[SNDW06] 3 3 7 Constraints
[BM07] 3 3 7 Redundancy
[SENB07] 7 3 7 Authentication, Constraints
[WTCT+08] 7 3 7 Constraints
[CCF09] 7 3 7 Constraints
[KLR09] 7 3 7 Constraints
[MB09] 3 7 7 Authentication
[LMSW10] 7 3 7 7
[ZZC+11] 3 3 3 Admission
[GLKS12] 7 7 3 7
[CCFD13] 7 3 7 Constraints
[GRSS14] 7 7 3 Diversity
[LYL14] 3 7 7 Reputation
2.7 Summary
This chapter presents an overview of P2P protocols, weaknesses, attacks, and mitigations. Therefore,
related surveys as well as articles on attacks and mitigations are discussed and categorized from
different viewpoints. The Eclipse attack has been chosen as an example for a taxonomic dissection of
P2P attacks with the goal to improve the understandability and guide the mitigation design.
P2P has become an established architectural approach for a wide range of recreational but also
critical distributed applications. While P2P’s scalability and decentralization unveil benefits not only
in terms of fault-tolerance and cost effectiveness, P2P protocols are susceptible to a variety of attacks.
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Attacks against P2P are often composite attacks, i.e., different weaknesses are exploited at once.
Hence, a holistic mitigation technique may be sophisticated, expensive, and potentially sacrifices
some of the P2P benefits.
Perimeter protection for service providers, as it is done for client/server systems, cannot be applied
to P2P systems as all peers take part in service provision and are scattered across different physical
network domains, which does not allow for a concise perimeter definition. Also, service state is
distributed among many peers and often replicated in addition.
A good mitigation technique should allow to keep application requirements, such as privacy or
anonymity, and furthermore support scalability and heterogeneity. For example, authentication
through cryptographic primitives is feasible for selected application scenarios, but it might be un-
desired in open system scenarios which possibly involve peers with limited computational or energy
resources. On the other hand, mitigation techniques which are desirable for decentralized and anony-
mous approaches may be infeasible for scalability or application timeliness requirements reasons.
An application scenario independent, scalable, heterogeneity fostering, and anonymous solution
requires various, intertwined mitigation techniques. Most of the proactive mitigation techniques
demand abandoning anonymity or scalability since peers are required to authenticate their service
requests and replies. Other techniques put efforts on spatial redundancy to outnumber adversarial
resources or diversity to overcome attackers that exploit deterministic protocol behavior. Reactive
mitigation techniques audit overlays regarding their compliance to distance metrics and desist from
further communicating with peers that display suspicious threshold violations. All in all, a combi-
nation of proactive and reactive P2P mitigation techniques is imperative to achieve adequate P2P
security in large-scale application secenarios.
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3 System & Attack Model
This chapter introduces technical descriptions and notions of the overlay network, the P2P protocol,
and the attack that is central to our investigations – the taLEA. Subsequent chapters build upon these
foundations.
3.1 Overlay Network Model
The P2P overlay network is modeled as a directed graph D = (P, E) with peers p ∈ P. Each peer p
maintains a routing table whose entries point to other peers o ∈ P, o 6= p. Whenever such a pointer
exists, an edge (p, o) ∈ E exists. We differentiate between incoming E−(p) and outgoing edges E+(p)
of a peer p. Furthermore, we split the peer set P into malicious peers M , benign peers B, and victim
peers V . P = B ∪ V ∪M and B ∩M = ;, B ∩ V = ;, as well as M ∩ V = ;, and N = |P|.
3.2 Structured P2P Protocol Model
Next, we outline seven features that characterize an abstract view on many structured P2P protocols.
3.2.1 Address space
This is the reference point of all resources to be managed in an overlay. The resources are the peers
and the data items associated to peers; both are mapped to the same address space. Contemporary
P2P protocols use an integer scale range of [0,2w − 1] with typically w ∈ {128,160} as an address
space definition. Resources obtain an overlay key κ with length w which is mapped onto the address
space. Therefore, an external identifier pex t is passed as parameter to a hash function: κ = h(pex t).
κ therefore represents a unique identifier (moreover, at least with a low collision probability) and
should be unmodified for the resource’s lifetime. Examples for external identifiers are the peer’s IP
or MAC address, the hash of a file for a data item, or a random number.
3.2.2 Distance function
P2P protocols implement a distance function for address space traversal as it is required for example
by routing, lookups, responsibility and replication mechanisms. Two overlay keys κ1 6= κ2 yield a
distance dist(κ1,κ2)> 0. Depending on the P2P protocol’s topology and address space organization,
different types of distance functions are applied, e.g., euclidean distance metrics, linear distance
metrics, or the XOR distance metric.
Most of this work focuses on protocols that make use of the XOR distance metric which calculates
distances based on the common prefix length (CPL) of two distinct peers. To compute the distance
of two peers, a XOR operation is performed on the bitstrings of both keys and the resulting bitstring
represents the distance.
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3.2.3 Routing table
A routing table is a data structure managed individually by each peer. It contains tuples that relate
a peer’s overlay key to a tangible underlay network contact information, e.g., an IP address and
port combination. Direct communication between peers imperatively demands a contact informa-
tion. Usually, c logN pointers are stored in a routing table and c is a protocol specific constant.
Furthermore, the structure of routing tables relates to the address space and distance notion, i.e.,
peers store k contact information tuples about peers whose key is in a distance range of [2i, 2i+1)
with i = 0 . . .w − 1 and k constant. With decreasing distance between any two peers, the amount
of common bits of their overlay keys increases. Some P2P protocols manage different routing tables,
e.g., to store special peers like the closest neighbors or the set of replicating peers independent of the
contact information about the generic peer population. To resolve contact information of unknown
peers, P2P protocols implement a lookup mechanism.
3.2.4 Message Passing
Peers implement an overlay messaging scheme and therefore provide send and receive operations.
These operations allow to forward messages to peers whose contact information is stored in the
routing table and to process those messages. P2P protocol maintenance tasks are based upon the
message passing scheme, e.g., the lookup mechanism which is described in the next subsection.
Furthermore, the message exchange operations are accessible as a foundation for defining P2P-based
applications.
3.2.5 Lookup Mechanism
In case a peer a has to send a message to another peer b but a has no contact information about b
in its routing table, then a lookup call is performed to resolve b’s contact information. To support
scalability, lookup mechanisms in most structured P2P protocols are subject to a design best practice
which we call convergent lookups. The mechanics are very simple: peer a chooses from its routing
table peer(s) with the smallest distance to b and sends the(m) lookup message(s). This approach is
iteratively or recursively repeated, until either b is resolved or a timeout occurs.
3.2.6 Proximity
The proximity of a peer p describes an address space region around p which is sparsely populated by
other peers. The average proximity size varies and depends for example on key length, the number
of peers in the overlay, and the address space mapping function.
Under the assumption of a uniformly distributed peer population, the average proximity size can
be approximated either by considering overlay parameters, or by analyzing routing tables of a subset
of peers. The approximation using overlay parameters takes the the average distance between peers
λ = 2w/N into account. A naive interpretation for the proximity range in a linear address space could
be ±λ/2. In the second approach, routing tables have to be analyzed in regard of contact information
to peers with smallest distance, e.g., which is the lowest non-empty list index i for peers at distance
[2i, 2i+1).
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3.2.7 Short & Long Distance Edges
We further introduce two categories of edges e ∈ E−. Firstly, short distance edges (SDE) which point
from within a peer p’s proximity towards itself. Secondly, long distance edges (LDE) which point
from peers outside p’s proximity to it.
3.3 Attack Model for taLEAs
The goal of a taLEA is to eclipse a set of victim peers, i.e., degrade their service provision to the bulk
of benign peers. We pick up the high-level taLEA notion that has been introduced in Section 2.5 and
provide further details. In a taLEA, malicious peers are located at specific topology locations and
less malicious peers are required than for example in the LEA case, i.e., |V | < |M |  |P| and w.l.o.g.
|M | = {1, . . . , 64}. Moreover, the amount of malicious peers required by the adversary to launch a
taLEA is constant and independent of N .
The topology-aware placement of malicious peers exploits a design weakness of convergent lookup
calls as depicted in Figure 3.1 and previously discussed in Section 2.5.2. In taLEAs, attackers have to
place their malicious peers mi close by a victim peer v ; a good attack strategy is a placement closer
than any other benign peer to the victim, i.e., population of the victim’s proximity. Once mi receive
a lookup call about v , an attacker has different options on how to further process that call, e.g.,
dropping the request, forwarding it to malicious or non-existent peers, or resolve incorrect contact
information, as it is suggested by the arrow labeled “v = m2” in Figure 3.1. Consequently, the lookup
initiator a is misled by the wrong contact information and will initiate a message exchange with m2
instead of v . We assume that peers cannot verify the correctness of assignments between keys and
contact information.
a
m1
[v]
b v
v? v?
m2
[v]
v=m2
Figure 3.1: taLEA attack against overlay lookup mechanism.
The preparation of both, LEA and taLEA, requires a thorough analysis of the application that is de-
ployed on the target overlay network in order to identify the victim peers. Yet, the taLEA preparation
additionally requires:
• analysis of the P2P protocol’s topology characteristics and design weaknesses (e.g., the lookup
mechanism).
• acquisition of peers that are suitable for the placement, e.g., due to key generation constraints,
which may stem from inadequate external features for key generation.
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Nevertheless, once the placement has been finished, taLEAs are naturally less expensive, as they
require only a small amount of peers to achieve an impact that is similar to the severity of a LEA
which requires about 10% to 20% malicious peers.
3.4 Summary
We have introduced models for overlay graph, protocol, and taLEAs. These models serve as the
foundation for our technical contributions that are presented throughout the subsequent chapters.
The models in this chapter are intentionally kept abstract in order to address different protocols from
the class of structured P2P protocols.
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4 taLEA Impact Evaluation on Structured P2P
Protocols
This chapter refers to contribution (C1) of this thesis. The goal is the impact assessment of taLEAs
on structured P2P protocols. Therefore, we propose a two-fold approach that involves heuristics and
simulation experiments.
4.1 Introduction
The overlay lookup mechanisms found in many structured P2P protocols show a convergent behavior
which represents a security weakness. A specific exploit for that weakness is the taLEA which has
been described in Section 3.3, and will be central to our investigations. We want to assess the impact
of taLEAs on the victim peers’ service provision. Therefore, we took the approach of evaluating the
amount of lookups that are resolved from peers within the victim peer’s proximity, which is consid-
ered malicious in taLEA scenarios. In order to come up with a quantitative assessment, we firstly
propose an abstract heuristic that reflects the overlay routing mechanism of structured P2P proto-
cols. After having established the abstract heuristic, we detail it for three different protocols, namely
Chord [SMLN+03], Pastry [RD01], and Kademlia [MM02]. The heuristics provide the probability
that lookup messages are sent to the victim’s maliciously populated proximity. They are validated in
a simulation case study which considers three different taLEA strategies. The study shows heuristic
accuracy of up to 90% for one of the strategies.
At next, we detail technical preliminaries before introducing the abstract and protocol-specific
heuristics. The chapter concludes with the case study and the subsequent result interpretation.
4.2 Approach: Lookup Susceptibility Estimation
The heuristic represents the basis for a systematic investigation of structured P2P protocol taLEA
susceptibility. Therefore, we propose an abstract heuristic to approximate the characteristics of con-
vergent overlay message routing as it is the case for many structured P2P protocols. The abstraction
serves as a template for subsequently derived protocol-specific heuristics.
In order to set up the context for the heuristic, we first present some key notions for overlay routing
and detail it for the specific protocols under our consideration.
4.2.1 Proximity & Lookup Definitions for Chord, Pastry, and Kademlia
Our definitions are based upon the proximity and convergent lookup mechanism definitions made in
Sections 3.2.6 and 3.2.5.
The size, shape, and expected amount of peers located in a proximity area depends besides
generic overlay parameters (such as key length or number of peers) also on the specific P2P pro-
tocol. Chord [SMLN+03] and Pastry [RD01] include the proximity concept in their routing table
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structures and lookup mechanisms. Kademlia [MM02] has no proximity concept explicitly specified.
At next, we detail our considerations for these three protocols as a prerequisite for the heuristics’
definitions.
Chord & Pastry
Chord and Pastry consider the proximity as an integral part of their two-tier lookup mechanisms.
Chord terms this proximity as a successor list; in Pastry it is called a leaf set. Successor list and leaf
set are fixed size data structures and separately managed from the routing table. As a first lookup
step, the algorithms check if the destination peer is located within the proximity. If that is not the
case, then the routing table is considered for selecting the next peers for the lookup call.
Chord and Pastry’s routing mechanisms are recursive by default, i.e., the lookup initiator passes
the call away and hands off control to subsequent peers in the call chain.
Kademlia
Kademlia’s routing algorithm follows a one-tier approach and its routing table consists of a single
data structure which is interpreted as a tree. Leaves of the tree are so called buckets which are lists
that store contact information of other peers. With increasing depth from the root of the routing
table tree, buckets contain contact information of further distant peers. Distance is measured using
the XOR metric and specified via the CPL (cf. Section 3.2.2).
We define the Kademlia proximity as the set of peers in the three highest and non-empty buckets
in the routing table tree. Lookups in Kademlia are usually iterative and spatially redundant for
timeliness and fault tolerance reasons.
4.3 Definition of the Abstract Heuristic for Lookup Susceptibility Estimation
On the previously sketched background, the proposed abstract heuristic develops a probabilistic basis
to distinguish if a lookup is resolved by peers in the destination’s proximity or by more distant peers.
We chose a probabilistic approach since deterministic solutions are not feasible due to the dynamic
nature of P2P overlays as caused by user behavior and/or peer or infrastructure perturbations.
In overlay lookups, lookup messages are either forwarded or resolved. Resolving implies that
the destination’s contact information has been found and will be returned to the lookup initiator.
Moreover, forwarding implies that the lookup message is passed to a peer that is usually closer to the
destination than the current peer. Messages can be resolved by two classes of peers: (i) peers in the
proximity which maintain an SDE towards the destination, or (ii) peers outside the proximity which
maintain an LDE towards the destination (cf. Section 3.2.7).
We observed through experiments that the probability of being resolved by an SDE is significantly
higher than via an LDE. Our abstract heuristic reflects this correlation.
The Overlay Distance Class (ODC) concept allows an analysis independent of routing paths lengths.
This abstraction reflects overlay message passing in an abstract structured overlay. In Figure 4.1,
three ODCs are depicted. The ODC with index l denotes the class of peers which require exactly
l + 1 message passing hops towards a destination peer (bold arrows). The ODC rectangle height
illustrates the size of classes. Peers k, m and j are located in the proximity of destination peer
v . Unlabeled arrows across ODCs denote lookup message forwarding, and arrows pointing to peer
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Figure 4.1: Overlay Distance Classes (ODCs) for an overlay with not more than 3 hops and with v as
destination peer.
v denote resolved lookups. Resolved lookups by proximate peers occur along SDEs (edges (k, v ),
(m, v ) and ( j, v )) and by non-proximate peers via LDEs (edge (a, v )). Three special cases of edges
may occur, these are indicated by dashed arrows in Figure 4.1 and represent above average lookup
convergence: (i) LDEs from ODC ≥ 1 pointing to the destination (edge (a, v )), (ii) LDEs that point
to an ODC which is not neighbored (edge (b, k)), and (iii) SDEs from an ODC ≥ 1 (edge ( j, v )).
At next, we propose the abstract heuristic. It is essentially defined by probabilities which are
explained in the following 5 steps. Each of these abstract 5 steps can be specifically instantiated for
target protocols as will be shown in Section 4.4.
Step 1: pSDE(v , l) is the probability that a peer in ODC l has an SDE to v . This reflects the likelihood
of a resolved lookup by peers belonging to ODC l which are also close to the destination.
Step 2: pLDE(v , l) is the probability that a peer in ODC l has an LDE to v . This reflects the likelihood
of resolved lookups by distant peers belonging to ODC l.
Step 3: pSDE|LDE(v , l) is the probability that a peer in ODC l has neither an SDE nor an LDE to peer
v . This reflects the likelihood of lookup forwarding by peers in ODC l to an intermediate peer on the
path towards the destination.
Thus, in a message loss free scenario, the following holds:
pSDE(v , l) + pLDE(v , l) + pSDE|LDE(v , l) = 1 (4.1)
Moreover:
Step 4: p∗SDE(v , l) is the probability that a lookup message whose originator is located in ODC l will
be resolved at some point with an SDE.
A compact representation of p∗SDE(v , l) is given by Equation 4.2:
p∗SDE(v , l) = pSDE(v , l)
+
l∑
i=1

pSDE(v , l − i) ·
i−1∏
j=0
pSDE|LDE(v , l − j)
 (4.2)
Step 5: pSDE(v ) is the probability that a lookup message sent by an arbitrary peer will be at some
point resolved by an SDE. This represents the final step of the abstract heuristic.
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In order to compute the overall probability pSDE(v ), the ODCs’ p∗SDE(v , l) for l = 0 . . . lmax need to
be weighted with respect to the ODC class size. The protocol-specific fraction of peers belonging to
each ODC is given by the weight function g(l). Thus, we modify Equation 4.2 to consider the ODC
size distribution of the specific target P2P protocol:
pSDE(v ) =
lmax∑
l=0
g(l) · p∗SDE(v , l) (4.3)
The parameter lmax specifies the ODC with highest distance to target peer v (lmax = 2 in Fig-
ure 4.1).
4.4 Protocol-Specific Heuristics
For the heuristic steps of pSDE , pLDE and pSDE|LDE developed in Section 4.2, we now provide specific
formulae for Chord, Pastry and Kademlia. Based on this, it is possible to compute the probability of
malicious message interception from a peer’s proximity for varied LEA strategies.
Heuristics are based upon the P2P protocol specifications and are subject to three assumptions: (i)
peers in the proximity have propagated to other peers in their address space region, (ii) intermediate
peers always decrease the distance towards the destination, (iii) routing tables are sufficiently popu-
lated with contact information. These assumptions allow us to simplify the heuristics definitions by
dropping the requirements to model special cases.
4.4.1 Chord
We assume an arbitrary peer pi that belongs to ODC i. N(i) denotes the expected number of peers
between pi and v in Chord’s address space, i.e., small values of i result in small values returned by
N(i) which we define as:
N(i) =
N
s(i)
(4.4)
The distance decrease on each subsequent hop during lookup message forwarding towards the
message’s destination is reflected by dividing N by s(i) which we define as:
s(i) = 22(lmax−i+1) (4.5)
Furthermore, we define
pSDE(v , i) =

1 if N(i)≤ κ
κ2
N(i)2 otherwise
(4.6)
This formula approximates the probability of peer pi having a SDE towards v . This probability
decreases for increasing distances between the two peers. Thus, equation 4.6 returns:
• 1 if N(i) is smaller or equal to the number of SDEs (=κ)
45
• a quadratic decrease if N(i) is larger than κ
To compute pSDE|LDE(v , i), a definition of the probability function pLDE(v , i) is required:
pLDE(v , i) =
(log2(N)− 2 · (lmax − i)) · s(i)
3 · N (4.7)
The expected amount of LDEs stored in each peer’s routing state is log2(N). On each hop towards
the destination the amount of LDEs possibly pointing at v decreases by 2 on average while the
amount of peers decreases by factor s(i).
On subsequent message passing hops, the amount of peers decreases as well as the number of LDEs
towards the destination. The relation between these two is required to estimate the probability of
having an LDE to the destination. Therefore, the number of remaining LDEs is divided by the number
of remaining peers. The division in Equation 4.7 by N results in the probability of an LDE pointing
at destination v . The factor of 13 is a calibration parameter that has been derived from simulation
experiments.
Thus, for Chord pSDE|LDE(v , i) is obtained as:
pSDE|LDE(v , i) = (1− pLDE(v , i)) · (1− pSDE(v , i)) (4.8)
g(i) is a weight function for the pSDE(v ). It specifies the number of peers for the i-th ODC. We
present the corresponding values in Figure 4.2 and set:
g(i) =
3
s(i)
(4.9)
The amount of peers in ODC i is one quarter the amount of peers in ODC i + 1. Consequently,
ODCs further away from v tend to hold exponentially more peers than closer ones. This guarantees
a number of hops that is logarithmically dependent on N , as each message forwarding hop traverses
at least one ODC according to our assumption.
With the previous definitions, all terms of Equation 4.3 are defined. The heuristic computations
for other overlay network sizes are presented in Section 4.6.
4.4.2 Pastry
Equation 4.10 calculates the probability of an arbitrary peer’s membership in ODC i. The distribution
has been calculated for different overlay network sizes and is also depicted in Figure 4.3.
g(i) =
2b − 1
2b·(lmax−(i+1)) (4.10)
Similar to Chord, the address space distance decreases on each hop. According to Pastry’s specifi-
cation, the distance to a destination peer v decreases by a factor of s(i) = 2b·(lmax−(i+1)).
Pastry’s prefix based distance notion which is encoded with a hexadecimal number system typically
of base 16, i.e., b = 4. All peers share at least a prefix of length 0, therefore N(lmax) yields the number
of all peers in the overlay.
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Figure 4.2: Chord ODC size distribution.
Peers with identical shared prefix lengths are in the same ODC. With increasing shared prefix
length, the number of peers in an ODC decreases exponentially. N(i)− N(i − 1) denotes the number
of peers in ODC i. For Pastry, N(i) is defined as:
N(i) =
N
2b·(lmax−(i+1)) (4.11)
To calculate the probability if an arbitrary peer of ODC i is located in v ’s proximity, the probability
of an SDE towards v in the respective ODC needs to be known. Therefore, we define T (i) as the
expected number of peers which have both, an SDE towards v and an ODC i membership. The sum
of probabilities of v belonging to ODC i such that not all of the SDEs to v are located in the same
ODC i is multiplied by the number of SDE neighbors which are located outside of ODC i. The result
is denoted as T (i):
T (i) =

2
N(i−1) ·
∑κ
2
j=1(κ− j) +κN(i)−κN(i)
for N(i)≥ κ2 + 1,
N(i) otherwise.
(4.12)
If N(i) ≤ κ2 + 1, two conclusions follow. First, T (i) = N(i), i.e., the whole ODC i is located in v ’s
proximity. Secondly, pSDE(v , i) = 1 because all peers in ODC i will have an SDE to v . T (i) is used
for the definition of pSDE(v , i). This definition includes three different cases to deal with varying
amounts of SDEs for different ODCs.
We define pSDE(v , i) for Pastry as follows:
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pSDE(v , i) =
§
1 if N(i − 1)≤ κ2 + 1
qSDE(v , i) otherwise
qSDE(v , i) =
¨
κ−T (lmax )
N(i)−N(i−1) for i = lmax
T (i)−T (i+1)
N(i)−N(i−1) otherwise
(4.13)
The two cases in qSDE(v , i) reflect the probability that a randomly chosen peer from ODC i is one of
the T (i) peers. The probability of a peer having an LDE to v increases exponentially with decreasing
distance to peer v , as exponentially less peers exist with this shared prefix length.
pLDE(v , i) =
2b(lmax−i+1)
N
(4.14)
pSDE|LDE(v , i) can be computed using the probability function of step 3 in Section 4.2. The formula
for the heuristic of the overall probability of a peer resolving the lookup via an SDE follows from
Equation 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Pastry ODC size distribution.
4.4.3 Kademlia
Kademlia differs from previous protocols with respect to the following aspects. Firstly, the message
passing mechanism does not explicitly differentiate between SDEs and LDEs. Despite of a concise
proximity definition (see Section 4.2.1), on a conceptual level lookups are forwarded via LDEs until
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the destination can be resolved. Secondly, message passing is per default iterative and spatially
redundant. Kademlia’s ODC size distribution (i.e., values for g(i)) is shown in Figure 4.4.
Besides these difference aspects, Kademlia’s message passing mechanism is similar to Pastry’s.
Therefore, the Kademlia heuristic is closely related to the Pastry heuristic; we highlight the differences
below.
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Figure 4.4: Kademlia ODC size distribution.
As Kademlia selects the most appropriate peers for the next hop from a peer set with a higher CPL
than the current peer, order statistics are applied to determine the expectation E{Ymax} for the highest
CPL as follows. We assume a Kademlia overlay with buckets of size 8, threefold spatial redundant
messaging, key length 128. The peers’ keys in a bucket can be seen regarded as 8 random instances
of a bitstring X with dimension 128. For the coordinates of a string
X i =
 
X i,1,X i,2, . . . ,X i,128

, i ∈ {1,2, . . . , 8}
holds:
P

X i, j = 0

=
1
2
= P

X i, j = 1

, j ∈ {1,2, . . . , 128} .
We consider a random variable Yi that denotes the CPL of a bitstring with the destination peer.
Therefore, Yi has values from {1,2, . . . , 128} with a probability distribution:
P [Yi = k] =
¨ 
1
2
k+1
for k ∈ {1,2, . . . , 126} 
1
2
128
for k ∈ {127,128}
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. Let  Y(1), . . . ,Y(8) be the sample ordered by size, the so called order statistics.
The expectation for the highest three (i.e., Y8, Y7, Y6) needs to be found. For simplicity, the CPL of
previous hops and one (from the bucket) is not considered in the example.
Equation 4.15 is based upon the Pastry heuristic, but references to b have been removed. id Leng th
represents the length of a key, typical values are 128, 160, or 192 bits. setSize stands for the number
of keys the highest CPL peers are chosen from, and max for the best peer to be considered, so
max = setSize yields the expectation for the peer with the maximum CPL.
E{Ymax}=∑id Leng th
k=0 k ·
∑setSize
m=max
 setSize
m

(P[Ymax ≤ k]m
·P[Ymax > k]setSize−m − P[Ymax ≤ k− 1]m
·P[Ymax > k− 1]setSize−m)
(4.15)
The Kademlia proximity has been defined by 24 peers which are stored in the three buckets with
the lowest indexes. Therefore, pSDE(v , i) is defined as in Equation 4.13 with κ= 24.
We define Equation 4.16 to calculate the probability of an arbitrary peer’s membership in ODC i.
g(i) =
1
2E{Ymax }·i (4.16)
The spatially redundant lookup mechanism in Kademlia returns over the first iteration a peer set
with potentially unequal CPLs.
The first iteration of pLDE(v , i) has to be calculated with z different values for b and with z equal
to the degree of parallelism. This is because the expected CPL of the first parallel hops chosen from
the sender’s routing table is smaller than the CPL of subsequent hops, as the set of peers stemming
from the responses is larger. Therefore, we introduce b0 and the formula changes accordingly to:
pLDE(v , i) =
¦
2b0
N(i) for i = lmax ,
2b(lmax−i+1)
N(lmax )
otherwise (4.17)
Equation 4.2 needs to be calculated individually for the different values of b0 as Kademlia takes
three different paths to the target, and the average of these will represent the value.
4.5 taLEA Strategies
This section introduces three taLEA strategies that will be used in subsequent simulation experi-
ments to validate the previously defined heuristics. The strategies are called proximity hijacking, and
proximity insertion with high and low distances. Our heuristics approximate the proximity hijacking
strategy. Thus, we deduce in the subsequent simulation case study the accuracy of our heuristics
from simulation runs according to the hijacking strategy.
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4.5.1 Strategy 1: Proximity Hijacking
In the case of proximity hijacking, no malicious peers are joined into the overlay network, but an
attacker overtakes (i.e. hijacks) benign peers in the victim peers’ proximities. An attacker could
achieve this, for example, by exploiting security weaknesses to gain administrative control over the
peers’ machines.
4.5.2 Strategies 2 & 3: Proximity Insertion
Using the proximity insertion strategy, new malicious peers are inserted into the victim peers’ prox-
imities. Malicious peers require a placement closer to the victim than any other benign proximate
peer; the keys of the malicious peers have to be chosen accordingly prior to the insertion. Due to the
self-organization in structured P2P overlays, victim peers finally exchange their benign proximities
with the malicious peers after some time.
We differentiate between the INSERT-low and INSERT-high proximity insertion strategies. INSERT-
low implies that malicious peers are inserted very close to the victim peer, whereas INSERT-high
relaxes this constraint a bit and requires the attacker to undercut the address space range of the
closest benign proximity peers. Therefore, INSERT-high usually results in a wider range of malicious
keys and INSERT-low accumulates malicious keys nearby the victim.
4.6 Case Study: Heuristics Validation
In this section, we validate our three heuristics by evaluating a taLEA simulation case study that
shows an accuracy of 90% for the proximity hijacking strategy. The proximity insertion strategies
reveal a higher deviation. Furthermore, we present simulation settings and performance metrics.
4.6.1 Simulation Settings
The simulation study was conducted with Chord, Pastry and Kademlia implementations in Over-
Sim [BHK09]. Parameters of our simulation case studies are shown in Table 4.1. Simulations are
conducted for varying overlay network sizes between 500 and 10000 benign peers. For benign peers,
we consider a uniform workload, i.e., each peer sends periodically a message to the victim peer v .
Benign peers b ∈ B and malicious peers m ∈ M are subject to churn, and the victim peer v is present
in the overlay for the whole simulation period.
4.6.2 Metrics
Our simulations investigate two performance aspects, namely the accuracy of our heuristics and the
degree of malicious lookup interception by varied taLEA strategies. The model accuracy is compared
to the experimental results of the hijack strategy. The attack severity is the ratio of messages that an
attacker can intercept to the total number of lookups that are addressed to v .
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Parameters Values
Simulated time up to 16 hours, depending on overlay size
Overlay sizes 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000
% ID space (λ) 0.2%, 0.1%, 0.05%, 0.02%, 0.01%
Churn 1h lifetime with exponentially distributed probability
Chord proximity size (κ) 8
Chord average proximity width (") 1.6%, 0.8%, 0.4%, 0.16%, 0.08%
Chord high width inserted peer distance from v or
one another
0.2%/κ, 0.1%/κ, 0.05%/κ, 0.02%/κ, 0.01%/κ
All overlays, low width inserted peer distance from
v or one another
0.000001% for all sizes
Pastry proximity size (κ) 16
Pastry average proximity width (") 3.2%, 1.6%, 0.8%, 0.32%, 0.16%
Pastry high width inserted peer distance from v or
one another
0.4%/κ, 0.2%/κ, 0.1%/κ, 0.04%/κ, 0.02%/κ
Kademlia proximity size (κ) 24
Kademlia average proximity width (") 5%, 2.5%, 1.25%, 0.625%, 0.3125%
Kademlia high width inserted peer distance from v
or one another
0.4%/κ, 0.2%/κ, 0.1%/κ, 0.04%/κ, 0.02%/κ
Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters.
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Figure 4.5: taLEA severity (Chord).
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4.6.3 Heuristics Accuracy Assessment
We now investigate the impact of different overlay network sizes, and the different taLEA strategies
on the accuracy of our heuristics. Hereby, we fix the number of malicious peers to |M | = κ, i.e.,
κ = 8 for Chord, κ = 16 for Pastry which reflects the default settings according to the protocols’
specifications and κ= 24 for Kademlia according to our notion of Kademlia’s proximity.
We present experiment results for the different strategies in Figures 4.5 (Chord), 4.6 (Pastry)
and 4.7 (Kademlia) for various overlay network sizes, the three taLEA strategies as well as our
heuristics.
The pSDE curve denotes the computation of our heuristics and the hijack curves denotes the Prox-
imity hijacking taLEA strategy that has been presented in Section 4.5. Deviations between pSDE and
the hijack curves are small, i.e., ±5%, which yields an accuracy of our heuristics of 90%. The pSDE
taLEA severity is about 90% for Chord, up to 80% for Pastry, and up to 82% for Kademlia. The
severity is equal to the degree of message interception, in case the victim peer’s proximity has been
hijacked or expelled through the newly inserted malicious peers. An important observation is that
the taLEA severity is almost independent of the overlay size.
Also, results for the proximity insertion taLEA strategies are presented. The severity of these two
strategies is higher for Chord and Pastry compared to the proximity hijacking simulation experiments.
Kademlia displays lower susceptibility for the Proximity Insertion taLEA strategy.
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Figure 4.6: taLEA severity (Pastry).
The difference between INSERT-low and INSERT-high is because of overlay maintenance effects
that consider changes of LDEs that pointed towards v before the taLEA was started.
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Figure 4.7: taLEA severity (Kademlia).
4.7 Limitations
The proposed heuristics approach shows a high accuracy compared to simulation experiments, yet
the applicability may be limited in case one of the following aspects is not fulfilled:
• The abstract heuristic assumes an overlay message passing scheme that is decreases the distance
towards the destination on every iteration. This is the case for structured P2P protocols that
make use of prefix-based message exchange, or overlay networks with ring topologies.
• The validation process showed a very high accuracy for the so called hijacking taLEA strategy
during which an attacker picks benign peers and transforms these into malicious peers. But, the
insertion strategies show a higher deviation to the heuristics and we believe that our heuristics
are not adequately addressing churn effects.
• Moreover, the large parameter landscape including workload, taLEA, protocol, and churn mod-
els has not been entirely addressed in this case study.
4.8 Summary & Conclusion
Maintaining a structured overlay topology is both, a key feature of structured P2P protocols and at
the same time a key security weakness that facilitates taLEAs because structured topologies favor
deterministic algorithm behavior, e.g., for exchanging messages.
We have presented the significant impact of taLEAs as a first contribution in this thesis using our
heuristic approach and through simulation experiments. The advantage of a heuristic approach is
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that impact estimations can be computed instantly (even for very large overlay networks), compared
to lengthy simulation experiment series (which are limited by computational resources and time).
Nevertheless, heuristics tend to evolve to rather complex models for a wide system parameter land-
scape. In the following chapter, we are focusing on the development of a taLEA countermeasure. In
order to assess the mitigation efficiency for a wide range of parameters including dynamic effects
in the overlay, we solely focus on simulation experiments. Nevertheless, for very specific and static
system settings, the approach using heuristics may be an adequate choice.
An important result of this chapter is the development of a heuristic template that can be extended
to protocol-specific heuristics. These allow to approximate the amount of potentially intercepted
lookup messages by malicious peers that are located in the proximity of a victim peer. The impact
estimation computed by the three protocol-specific heuristics has shown an accuracy of up to 90%
compared to results gathered through simulation experiments. Both, the analytical and simulation
case studies have shown that the last hop of a route significantly favors (with a probability higher
than 70%) SDEs to deliver messages to their destination. The proposed taLEA strategies utilize only 8
(Chord), 16 (Pastry), or 24 (Kademlia) malicious peers and cause a significant impact on the overlay.
We have made another interesting observation during experiments using the insertion taLEA strate-
gies in Chord and Pastry overlays: maintenance sometimes replaces LDEs incident to the victim by
LDEs incident with malicious peers. Consequently, this increases the taLEA severity. This results in
message interception of more than 90% for Chord and Pastry. Contrary, in Kademlia the proximity
insertion strategies achieve a message interception of up to 50% which is clearly below the proximity
hijack strategy’s severity. One possible reason is the convergence of routing paths towards frequently
addressed peers and the synthetic design of our simulation workload. We focus on a wider parameter
landscape in subsequent chapters of this work using simulation experiments.
These results are crucial not only to conduct taLEAs, but mainly to justify the development of
requisite countermeasures for mitigating taLEAs.
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5 taLEA Mitigation: Divergent Lookups
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides our taLEA mitigation approach. The susceptibility analysis in Chapter 4 pre-
sented the significant impact of taLEAs on the service provision of victim peers. We have identified
convergent lookups as a design weakness that allows to launch taLEAs. To this end, we propose in
this chapter divergent lookups as a mitigation measure which refers to contributions (C2) and (C3) of
this thesis.
5.2 Motivation: Susceptibility Analysis of Convergent Lookups
In a taLEA, malicious peers are placed closer to victim peers than any benign peer in the overlay, i.e.,
they populate the victim’s proximity (cf. Section 3.3). As a consequence, malicious peers receive a
significant amount of convergent lookup calls from benign peers and are then able to launch further
attacks such as returning bogus information or denial of service.
One way to prevent malicious peers from conducting a taLEA is to restrict the lookup calls of benign
peers to non-proximity address space regions of the destination peer. In that region, we expect under
taLEA assumptions no malicious peers. This leads to
Hypothesis 1. In order to increase the lookup mechanism’s taLEA resilience, a lookup has to avoid the
destination’s proximity.
In the next subsection we provide a discussion about a convergent lookup’s algorithm. This helps
to understand the established lookup concepts and it functions as an algorithmic basis for divergent
lookups.
5.2.1 Pseudocode Discussion
The pseudocode for convergent lookups is presented in Algorithm 1. Now, we describe the parameters
as well as the algorithm’s instructions. Four parameters are provided, the key κ of the peer to be
looked up, the routing table r t of the lookup initiator, α denotes the degree of spatial redundancy,
and imax defines the maximum amount of lookup iterations in order to limit the network overhead
and to prevent a lookup from accidentally running forever. The convergent behavior can be observed
in line 4 of the algorithm where at most α closest peers to the destination are picked from the queue
Q and queried using the query primitive. This primitive sends lookup request messages to other peers
picked from the queue, requesting contact information for key κ. If queried peers do not know about
κ, these return closer contacts towards κ as a proposal for further requests in the next iteration. All
query results are written back to the queue in line 5 of the algorithm. Finally, line 6 checks if κ has
been resolved and is contained in the queue, otherwise the algorithm loops into the next iteration.
Algorithm 1 shows the iterative variant, which is by default used in Kademlia. Iterative lookup
variants usually impose a higher network overhead as each iteration is coordinated by the lookup
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initiator again. Also, recursive algorithms exist and we propose iterative and recursive pseudocode
for divergent lookups at next.
Usually, convergent lookups show good performance with O(log N) steps. One of their major
drawbacks is the taLEA susceptibility.
Algorithm 1 Convergent Lookup (iterative)
1: procedure LOOKUP(κ, r t,α, imax)
2: Q← r t
3: for i = 1 to imax do
4: C ← query ≤ α closest peers in Q for κ
5: Q←Q ∪ C
6: if C contains c with c.κ == κ then
7: return c.IPaddress
8: end if
9: end for
10: return NOTFOUND
11: end procedure
5.3 (C2) Divergent Lookups - Random Walks
We define two essential lookup requirements for mitigating taLEAs which will be considered in our
divergent lookup implementations:
1. Avoid the destination’s proximity.
2. Drop the lookup convergence criterion.
The first requirement stems from Hypothesis 1 and it is realized by the definition of a proximity
threshold parameter which may not be overrun by the lookup. The second requirement is addressed
by replacing the criterion that only closest peers to the destination are queried. This ensures that
lookups do not converge towards the proximity threshold and potentially starve. In our second
contribution’s case study, we make no assumptions about the distribution of peers in the overlay that
store an LDE to the destination in their routing table. Consequently, we apply a random walk search
strategy.
At next, we discuss the pseudocode of our iterative divergent lookup variant that makes use of a
random walk search strategy.
5.3.1 Pseudocode Discussion
We now detail the divergent lookup with random walk strategy (divRW), the respective pseudocode
is presented in Algorithm 2. The divRW algorithm has an additional parameter tp which defines the
proximity threshold in terms of a common prefix length. The threshold depends on the key length
and the amount of peers on the overlay network. The noteworthy differences to the convergent
algorithm can be seen in lines 4 and 5, respectively. Also, these modifications satisfy the previously
introduced two requirements. Firstly, in line 4, peers from κ’s proximity, i.e., those sharing a higher
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Algorithm 2 Divergent Lookup using random walk search strategy (divRW) - iterative
1: procedure LOOKUP(κ, r t,α, imax , tp)
2: Q← r t
3: for i = 1 to imax do
4: Q←Q \{sharing CPL > tp with κ}
5: C ← query ≤ α random peers in Q for κ
6: Q←Q ∪ C
7: if C contains c with c.κ== κ then
8: return c.IPaddress
9: end if
10: end for
11: return NOTFOUND
12: end procedure
CPL than tp with κ, are removed to avoid malicious peers in Q. Moreover, in line 5 peers are selected
in a random fashion which replaces the convergent distance decreasing strategy.
We expect from divRW a significant lookup reliability improvement over the convergent variant
under taLEA conditions. Clearly, the message complexity and timeliness of divRW will exceed those
of convergent ones. Therefore, we aim to improve on the performance by a more advanced divergent
lookup search strategy, which is detailed in the next section.
5.4 (C3) Divergent Lookups - P2P Address Space Slicing (PASS)
Due to the higher network overhead of divRW especially for large overlay networks, we propose the
P2P address space slicing (PASS) technique as a performance improvement. The PASS approach does
not abandon the random walk search strategy, but considers a smaller region on the address space
than [0, tp]. Hence, PASS further segregates the address space according to assumptions in which
regions κ can be found with high chance and few algorithm iterations.
Firstly, we show an example for PASS before providing analytical insights about adequate slice
selection.
5.4.1 PASS: Slicing Example
This example makes use of the CPL notion (cf. Section 3.2.2) in view of segregating an overlay’s
address space. For illustration reasons, we refer to a smaller address space which has three peers
assigned to it.
We assume for this example a key length w = 5 which results in an address space range [0,31].
Furthermore, we assign to three peers p1, p2, and p3 the decimal keys κ1 = 2, κ2 = 9, and κ3 = 10.
Figure 5.1 shows the address space with the three peers and the CPL regions on the address space
in terms of p3. The key ranges for a given CPL slice depend on the keys’ binary prefixes of length 0
through 4, as shown in Table 5.1. In this table, the binary key pattern is augmented with boxes which
encapsulate the prefixes and underscore characters show mutable bits. CPLs 0 through 3 require a
further fixed bit q next to the prefix because for ¬ q the pattern would be classified as the next
higher CPL. The table’s rightmost column denotes the CPL slice’s size, i.e., their share for potentially
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Figure 5.1: Address space and CPL regions for peer p3.
Figure 5.2: CPL space from peer p3’s perspective.
mappable peers; obviously longer prefixes induce a smaller size. The actual slice assignment from
peer p3’s perspective is depicted in Figure 5.2.
5.4.2 Analytical Discussion
The previous example provided insights on the address space organization in regard of CPL slices
and their sizes. Now, we focus on the partial view each peer maintains about the overlay network’s
address space in order to understand which CPL slice should be selected for performant divergent
lookups. Therefore, we propose Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. For two arbitrary peers, the likelihood of one peer having stored contact information about
the other increases for decreasing distance.
We provide a proof for Lemma 1 under consideration of two assumptions:
1. The P2P protocol uses CPL as a distance notion.
2. Message exchange among peers is subject to a uniform distribution with a reasonable frequency.
CPL Binary key pattern Decimal key range for slice Share w.r.t. address space
0 1 _ _ _ _ [16, 31] 0.5
1 0 0 _ _ _ [0, 7] 0.25
2 0 1 1 _ _ [12, 15] 0.125
3 0 1 0 0 _ [8, 9] 0.0625
4 0 1 0 1 _ [10, 11] 0.0625
Table 5.1: CPL slices example for peer p3 with key κ3 = 1010 = 010102.
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Figure 5.3: Simplified example to illustrate routing table storage capacity w.r.t. CPL slices, w = 5 and
k = 2.
Proof. We assume the existence of peers p, and q in an address space of size 2w. p and q share a
CPL of wp,q = w− θ with w being the key length, and θ ∈ {1, . . . ,w− 1}. Clearly, the CPL is larger
for small values of θ . Routing tables of peers consist of w lists with usually k ∈ {1, . . . , 20} entries
storage capacity for contact information of peers at a distance of [2i, 2i+1) with i = 0, . . . ,w − 1.
Therefore, q is stored in list i = θ . Hence, for a smaller CPL (i.e., a larger value for θ) the range
of potentially selectable keys for storage increases exponentially whereas the lists’ storage space size
k remains constant. Consequently, the likelihood of storing a peer with small values for θ is higher
than for a peer with a large value for θ .
The essence of Lemma 1 is depicted in Figure 5.3 as another example for w = 5 and k = 2.
This example does not relate to the perspective of a specific key, but visualizes the two storage slots
(greed shaded keys) per CPL for each of the w routing table lists. For a CPL of 3 and 4, a routing table
could store all potentially mappable keys in the respective slices, and the storage capacity decreases
exponentially with decreasing CPL.
5.4.3 PASS Design Rationale
Lemma 1 supports the claim that searching non-proximity slices closer towards the proximity thresh-
old of the destination peer is more performant. We now provide insights on the different CPL regions,
in order to motivate the CPL slice selection of the PASS approach. Figure 5.4 depicts the CPL scale
on behalf of an arbitrary destination peer. We define three CPL thresholds, i.e., tp is the proximity
threshold, t l is the lower threshold for PASS searches, and tu is PASS’s upper threshold. Moreover,
0≤ t l ≤ tu ≤ tp < w. The following three CPL slice ranges are considered inadequate:
CPL
0 w
search 
tu-tl slices
malicious 
peers
poor 
efficiency
tl tu
more peers per slice
Likelihood of knowing destination
more dead-ends per slice
tp
dead 
ends
Figure 5.4: Address space slicing illustration on a CPL scale.
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• The subrange [0, t l) contains a very large amount of peers which also have – compared to the
other subranges – a low chance of knowing the destination peer. Searching this region would
negatively affect the divergent lookup’s performance.
• The subrange (tu, tp] contains a high amount of dead ends. These are peers, which know the
destination neither directly nor transitively, i.e., they cannot find a path to a peer in the same
slice which has contact information about the destination peer. Dead ends exist in all slices,
but slices close-by the proximity threshold are sparsely populated; based on the assumption of a
uniform workload distribution, these few peers have a lower chance of knowing the destination
peer compared to a slice that contains more peers. Few peers and a high amount of dead ends
would impair the divergent lookup’s reliability.
• The subrange (tp,w] is by taLEA assumptions populated with malicious peers and should not
be searched in order to prevent an attack from being activated.
As a consequence, PASS selects the CPL slice range [t l , tu] for performing divergent lookups.
Clearly, a good choice for thresholds decides on reliability and performance. Therefore two con-
ditions should be satisfied:
1. Slices should contain peers that know the destination peer with a high probability.
2. Peer population size of the selected slices must allow for exhaustive searching in the worst case.
Naturally, the thresholds depend on P2P protocol parameters and the amount of peers in the over-
lay. We provide experimental insights that support the threshold selection in Section 5.5.7.
At next, we discuss the iterative and recursive pseudocode of divPASS.
5.4.4 Pseudocode Discussion
We propose PASS for divergent lookups (which we abbreviate as divPASS) as an optimization of
divRW with special focus on reducing the network overhead. It is subject to Hypothesis 1 and we
provide insights on the iterative (Algorithm 3) and recursive (Algorithm 4) divPASS pseudocode and
explain their differences to divRW (Algorithm 2).
Iterative divPASS
In divPASS, the proximity threshold parameter tp has been replaced by the lower t l and upper tu
threshold parameters which denote the slice range in which κ’s contact information is searched for
(lines 3, 5, and 12). Because a lookup initiating peer could be of considerable CPL distance to κ,
the lower bound condition for t l is increasingly relaxed in case no suitable candidates can be found
(lines 4 through 7 in Algorithm 3). After an initial peer candidate set was found (line 8), divPASS
searches in the given CPL slices for κ (lines 9 through 17).
Recursive divPASS
The recursive divPASS algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4. It consists of two procedures, i.e.,
lookup-initiator() which is executed on the lookup initiating peer and lookup() for the recursion,
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Algorithm 3 Divergent Lookup (iterative) - PASS
1: procedure LOOKUP(κ, r t,α, imax , t l , tu)
2: j← 1
3: Q← r t \{sharing t l > CPL > tu with κ}
4: while |Q|== 0 and j ≤ t l do
5: Q← r t \{sharing (t l − j)> CPL > tu with κ}
6: j← j + 1
7: end while
8: if |Q|> 0 then
9: for i = 1 to imax do
10: C ← query ≤ α random peers in Q for κ
11: Q←Q ∪ C
12: Q←Q \{sharing t l > CPL > tu with κ}
13: if C contains c with c.κ== κ then
14: return c.ip-address
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: return NOTFOUND
19: end procedure
which corresponds to a remote procedure call. Moreover, the recursive variant uses a time-to-live
variable T T Lmax instead of a maximum iteration counter as it is the case for the iterative version.
For each of the α recursions a counter variable T T L is maintained to delimit the maximum recursion
depth. The initial candidate selection with lower threshold relaxation can be found in lines 4 through
8 similar to the iterative divPASS algorithm. Lines 10 through 14 initiate α parallel independent
lookups by calling the lookup procedure which is implemented in lines 21 through 33. The latter
procedure contacts only a single peer in the recursive step, in order to bind the parallelism degree to
α.
5.5 Evaluation
To complement the analytic basis behind divRW and divPASS, we have conducted extensive simu-
lations to validate the reliability and performance of divergent lookups. Specifically, three distinct
simulation case studies have been conducted:
1. taLEA case study - underlines the significant taLEA impact on convergent lookups. This case
study is considered as a baseline to experimentally substantiate the mitigation potential of
divergent lookups in the third case study.
2. PASS threshold selection - provides experimental insights how suitable slices can be identified
for PASS and we show that overlay networks with varying peer population sizes reveal similar
suitability characteristics.
3. divPASS vs. divRW - presents the assessment of divRW and divPASS. Furthermore, it displays
quantitative results in terms of reliability, performance, and timeliness of our approaches.
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Algorithm 4 Divergent Lookup (recursive) - PASS
1: procedure LOOKUP-INITIATOR(κ, r t,α, T T Lmax , t l , tu)
2: j← 1
3: r ← NULL
4: Q← r t \{sharing t l > CPL > tu with κ}
5: while |Q|== 0 and j ≤ t l do
6: Q← r t \{sharing (t l − j)> CPL > tu with κ}
7: j← j + 1
8: end while
9: if |Q|> 0 then
10: for i = 1 to α do
11: p← random peer from Q
12: R← p.lookup(κ, p,α, T T Lmax , t l , tu)
13: Q←Q \{p}
14: end for
15: if R contains r with r.κ== κ then
16: return r.ip-address
17: end if
18: end if
19: return NOTFOUND
20: end procedure
21: procedure LOOKUP(κ, p,α, T T L, t l , tu)
22: if p.r t contains κ then
23: return entry in p.r t for κ
24: else if T T L > 0 then
25: T T L← T T L − 1
26: Q← p.r t \{sharing t l > CPL > tu with κ}
27: c← pick random peer from Q
28: Q←Q \{c}
29: return c.lookup(κ, c,α, T T L, t l , tu)
30: else
31: return NOTFOUND
32: end if
33: end procedure
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Before discussing results of these three evaluations, we first introduce our simulation environment,
models, metrics, and parameters.
5.5.1 Simulations Overview
Experiments are performed using the discrete event simulator OMNeT++ [Pon93] and the Over-
Sim [BHK09] extension that provides P2P protocol implementations. The simulator and the exten-
sion have a good reputation in the P2P research community for conducting experimental research
case studies.
Each experiment run is simulated for 8 hours simulation time and is repeated at least 20 times. The
average metric measurements are provided along with 95% confidence intervals. The measurements
are recorded for the last 8000 seconds before the end of each run. This way, we ensure that peers
have stored contact information of others in their routing tables due to the exposure to simulated
workload and churn effects. Experiments using iterative and recursive lookups have been conducted
by extending OverSim’s Kademlia and R/Kademlia implementations correspondingly. Table 5.2 lists
the most important simulation experiment parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α (iterative) 10 α (recursive) 3
imax (iterative) 50 T T Lmax (recursive) 50
tp (divRW) 80 w 128
t l (divPASS) 4 tu (divPASS) 6
Table 5.2: Simulation parameters.
5.5.2 Simulation Churn Models
Churn denotes entering and leaving peers in the overlay. These dynamic effects are often imposed
by user behavior, benign failures of peers, or failures of the underlying networking infrastructure.
Churn models define an average lifetime of a peer, i.e., the amount of time units it remains on the
overlay network after joining it. Moreover, an average dead time is also part of our churn models
to denote the waiting period after a peer leaves before a new one is joining the overlay. Using this
approach, the peer population fluctuates only slightly once the initial overlay construction has been
completed. Peer lifetimes are modeled using the Pareto distribution [YLWL06]. Three churn models
are used throughout our studies:
• NoChurn Refers to a static peer population. Peers join at the specified rate at the beginning of
the simulation and remain until the end. While victim peers v ∈ V and malicious peers m ∈ M
are in our experiments subject to the NoChurn model, this does not always hold for the benign
peer population b ∈ B. Benign peers can also be subject to the two Pareto models described at
next.
• P-500 This churn model is subject to a Pareto distribution with average peer lifetime and dead
time of 500 seconds. Given the experiment runtime, this results in approximately 50 full ex-
changes of the benign peer population.
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• P-7200 This model is similar to the previous one, but with an average lifetime and dead time of
7200 seconds which results in approximately 4 full exchanges of the benign peer population.
5.5.3 Simulation Workload Models
The simulation experiments are subject to two different application workload models. Peers are
sending application messages on average every 10 seconds to a randomly chosen peer, the sending
interval is subject to a uniform distribution with a standard deviation of 5 seconds. Thereby, peers
trigger lookup calls in case the random destination peer is unknown for the originator. The two
workload classes differ in how the destination peers are chosen.
• (W1) - Fully Distributed Application This workload class selects the destination peer uni-
formly distributed [GDS+03] from V ∪ B.
• (W2) - Service Overlay Network This workload class selects in 90% of the cases the destination
peer uniformly distributed from V and in the remaining 10% of the cases from B.
5.5.4 Simulation taLEA Model
Varying amounts of malicious peers |M | are introduced into the overlay throughout our taLEA ex-
periments. To model the adversarial behavior, their lookup mechanism has been modified such that
reply messages contain incorrect contact information of the destination peer, if the destination is a
victim peer v ∈ V . This behavior can be detected by the lookup success rate metric which counts
the aforementioned behavior as an unsuccessful lookup. Evaluation metrics are defined in the next
subsection.
5.5.5 Evaluation Metrics
Three metrics steer our reliability and performance assessments for the different lookup variants:
• Lookup Success Rate (LSR) - this is our primary reliability metric. It specifies the average per-
centage of successful lookup calls of benign peers b ∈ B which request contact information of
victim peers v ∈ V . Moreover, we consider LSR as a taLEA resilience indicator in the divergent
lookup validation process. A lookup fails once it receives contact information from a malicious
peer m ∈ M or when the maximum number of iterations imax or the time-to-live T T Lmax has
exceeded and NOTFOUND is returned.
• Message Complexity (MC) - this is our primary performance metric. It allows to assess the
network overhead of a given lookup method. It is the average number of messages sent of all
successful lookup calls initiated by b ∈ B and destined to v ∈ V .
• Number of Iterations (NoI) - this is our secondary performance metric. It offers an estimate for
divergent lookup latencies. NoI is the average amount of algorithm iterations or recursions until
it receives the first successful lookup reply, i.e., a reply by b ∈ B that points at the destination
v ∈ V .
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5.5.6 taLEA Case Study
We conduct taLEAs with varied amounts of malicious peers |M | in order to assess the lookup message
loss, i.e., whenever a malicious peer receives a lookup message destined to a peer v ∈ V , it is
indicated as a lost message. Furthermore, we assess the message complexity for convergent lookups
to compare them with the divergent variants. Experiment results for iterative convergent routing are
presented in Figure 5.5 for N = {5000,10000,50000} peers. Both workloads show a message loss
of at most 89% for the P-500 churn model with |M | = 64, and close to 45% (W1) or 40% (W2)
with |M | = 8. Message loss decreases for increasing peer lifetimes in both workload scenarios. MC
measurements are in the range from 10.3 to 11.3 for W1 and 4.9 to 5.3 with the W2 workload.
Figure 5.6 presents message loss for the recursive convergent lookup in the W1 workload scenario.
The average message loss for |M |= 64 is – when compared to the iterative variant – with about 61%
to 11% lower and yields rates between 28% and 78%. MC measurements are in the range of 2.9 to
4.3.
Interpreting the Results
Peers in the NoChurn scenario are exposed for the longest time to the workload, therefore they have
a higher chance of storing the correct contact information of victim peers which may be replied to
other benign peers in subsequently received lookups. Hence, in P-500 and P-7200 scenarios it is
more likely that peers request contact information for v ∈ V and retrieve incorrect contact informa-
tion. Moreover, the provision of bogus contact information about v ∈ V is increasing with |M | and
consequently message loss increases as well.
5.5.7 PASS Threshold Selection
The reliability and message complexity of divPASS depends on choosing good lower and upper thresh-
olds t l and tu. Insights about the selection are provided through an experiment set whose results are
shown in Figures 5.7a through 5.7d. These present two ratios: (i) peers with LDEs to the destination
peers (blue squares) and (ii) no-dead-ends (red diamonds). The number of peers per slice (dashed
line) denotes the y-axis on the right hand side. All x-axes show the CPL range [0,20]. The depicted
measurements reflect simulations with the W1 workload and the NoChurn model for different val-
ues of N and w; the choices led to different address space load factors ρ = N2w , which have been
considered in this experiment series to compare dense to sparsely populated address spaces.
Interpreting the Results
Similar key characteristics of Figures 5.7a through 5.7d show an increase of peers with LDE ratio up to
CPL 12 (or 14 for Figure 5.7d) whereas the no-dead-end ratio decreases. As a consequence, the upper
threshold tu should be chosen such that the chance of contacting a dead-end can be neglected. The
selection of the lower threshold t l must ensure that the amount of peers populated in the lookup slice
range [t l , tu] is not excessively large, such that α parallel lookups with search depth imax (T T Lmax
respectively for the recursive variant) have a high probability of finding an LDE to the destination.
We conjecture that the intersection of the LDE curve and the no-dead-end curve is a good choice for
the lower threshold. Thus, for the set of experiments using w = 128 and N = {5000,10000,20000}
in the next subsection, we have selected t l = 4 and tu = 6 as divPASS parameters.
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We believe due to the measurement similarities that overlays with both, high load factors and
longer key lengths, can also apply divPASS in regard of the expected reliability and performance, i.e.,
overlays hosting millions of peers
5.5.8 Divergent Lookup Reliability and Performance Case Study
In this subsection, divPASS is compared to divRW using our three metrics LSR, MC, and NoI.
Iterative, W1
Figures 5.8a through 5.8c show experiments for the iterative divergent lookup comparison using
workload W1. In terms of LSR, a pairwise comparison of divPASS to divRW for similar (churn, N)
configurations always shows a better LSR measurement for divPASS; its measurements are in the
range of 90% to 100% successful lookups, whereas divRW results are in the range of 60% to 90%.
Figure 5.8b depicts MC, and shows for all divPASS configurations a significant lower overhead for
the same divRW configuration. Clearly, divPASS MC outranks divRW MC by factor 3 to 6 depending
on the considered (churn, N) configuration. The iterative divPASS experiments have been conducted
using α = 10, yet the average MC measurements show 10 messages or less for some of the con-
figurations. This happens, as PASS searches slices that reveal a high destination knowledge ratio
but are sparsely populated which may result in a successful divergent lookup call after querying less
than α peers. Figure 5.8c shows the NoI; comparable to the previous MC discussion, we find for
NoI significantly better divPASS measurements, i.e., in the range between 1.3 to 1.6 iterations. The
corresponding divRW NoI measurements are in the range between 2.2 and 3.4 iterations. Clearly,
divPASS shows better results which makes us believe that divPASS would provide better latencies
than divRW for successful lookups in real networks.
Iterative, W2
Figures 5.9a through 5.9c show experiment results to compare the iterative divergent lookups using
workload W2. Average LSR in Figure 5.9a shows equally good results for divPASS like in the W1
workload case, yet divRW has a higher LSR in W2 compared to W1. Overall, all LSR results are in
the range between 98% to 100%. Average MC results are shown in Figure 5.9b. The maximum MC
improvement of divPASS over divRW is about factor 2 in the W2 case. Although, the MC difference
between divPASS and divRW is lower for W2 than for W1, it is important to consider the different
MC scale ranges of W2 (Figure 5.9b) and W1 (Figure 5.8b). divPASS MC measurements are in the
range of 5.8 to 10.2 and divRW in the range of 11 to 13. NoI measurements in Figure 5.9c show in
the pairwise (churn, N) configuration comparison that divPASS measurements do not outrank those
of divRW like it is the case for W1. Because in W2 more contact information among benign peers
about v ∈ V exists, divRW scores better as it can select without slice range restriction easily α peers
during the first iteration with a high probability of a successful lookup. As divPASS searches a subset
of slices, it may occur that during the first iteration less than α peers for the given slice range are
found. If these peers from the first iteration cannot resolve v ∈ V , a second iteration is required. All
measurements are close to each other in the range of 1 to 1.4 iterations.
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Recursive, W1
Figures 5.10a through 5.10c show experiment results for the comparison of the recursive divergent
lookup variants using workload W1. LSR measurements in Figure 5.10a show success rates in the
range of 95% to 100% and divRW shows slightly better LSR results than divPASS. On the other hand,
MC for divPASS is around 10 messages while divRW is in the range of 18 to 39 messages, as can be
taken from Figure 5.10b. NoI measurements are in the range of 1.4 to 2.5 iterations, as depicted in
Figure 5.10c.
5.5.9 Interpreting the Results
The first part of our case study shows that taLEA may cause message loss of 60% up to 89%. We pro-
pose PASS for divergent lookups to mitigate taLEAs and propose a PASS threshold selection method
that considers two ratios: peers knowing the destination and no-dead-ends per slice. Experiment
data supports the claim that PASS is a suitable taLEA mitigation approach for very large overlay
networks with hundreds of thousands to potentially millions of peers. The actual divPASS valida-
tion yields a worst case result of 90% LSR. Failing divPASS lookups can be ascribed to dead-ends or
lack of suitable candidate peers, especially for churn models with short average peer lifetimes. The
pairwise comparison of iterative divPASS to iterative divRW shows divPASS’s superiority for the W1
workload model. The W2 workload model shows similar and good LSR results for both approaches.
Furthermore, divPASS either significantly reduces MC or is at worst on par with divRW. Also, NoI for
divPASS shows an improvement over divRW in case of workload W1. In case of W2, correct contact
information of the victim peers is widely available in the overlay, which allows divRW to retrive it
faster than divPASS which has to select an appropriate set of peers for the smaller PASS search region.
5.6 Limitations
Divergent lookups are adequate for taLEA mitigation in various contexts, yet they are limited in their
applicability if one of the following aspects is not fulfilled:
• Divergent lookups require LDEs in the overlay graph. The creation of LDEs is usually a side
effect of message exchange among peers and the mandated lookup calls beforehand. Therefore,
divergent lookups require in general overlays with a reasonable application workload frequency.
• Malicious peers conducting the taLEA may not have joined the overlay from the beginning or
(in churn scenarios) must join with a reasonable delay – which is workload dependent – after
the victim peer has joined the overlay. Otherwise, either no LDEs or only incorrect LDEs will
exist in the overlay graph. In other words, benign information about the victim peers has to be
available.
• Divergent lookups have a slightly higher cost in terms of network overhead compared to con-
vergent ones, this may not be desired in some systems.
5.7 Summary & Conclusion
We have presented a novel lookup algorithm for structured P2P protocols. The lookups use two
different search strategies and show high resilience to taLEAs, i.e., the taLEA mitigation rate is on
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average 90% to 100%. The new lookups have been validated using simulations for the P2P protocols
Kademlia and R/Kademlia which are subject to iterative and recursive lookup message exchanges.
Divergent lookups fulfill requirements that address a potentially large field of application cases and
also pertain fundamental P2P features:
• Reliability: divergent lookups mitigate taLEAs with a high probability.
• Scalability: searches should be applicable irrespective of the overlay’s size or the application
running on it.
• Decentralized operation: searches should be satisfiable with data stored in routing tables and
do not require an external oracle.
• Timeliness: should be similar to convergent lookups, such that divergent lookups can be applied
for a wide field of established P2P applications as well.
• Anonymity: peers do not require a certificate or public key infrastructure in order to authenti-
cate themselves for joining and other operations on the overlay network.
The achievements relate mainly to contributions (C2) and (C3) of this thesis. As an extension to
contribution (C1), we have provided in this chapter a more detailed taLEA baseline of convergent
lookup susceptibility than in the previous chapter. The difference is mostly in the wider parameter
landscape, such as total amount of peers, varying amounts of malicious peers, more churn scenarios,
two workload models, and both iterative and recursive routing. The workloads have been defined to
be similar to fully distributed applications, such as data discovery using a DHT, and also to service
overlay networks which usually contain a few sources and sinks that are considered more important
than the majority of peers.
We have introduced three metrics which allow for a reliability and message complexity cross com-
parison of convergent and divergent lookups. An additional metric measures the number of iterations
in divergent lookup simulations, its average serves as a rough estimate for timeliness, especially to
validate divPASS’s superiority over divRW. Moreover, we believe that divPASS is applicable for overlay
networks with hundreds of thousands to millions of peers based on experimental results to support
the slice selection process of PASS. The analysis showed similar characteristics in terms of two ra-
tios (per slice LDE ratio and no-dead-end ratio) independent of different network sizes and overlay
densities.
The implementation overhead for divergent lookups requires only small changes to convergent
lookups, nevertheless, a change of the protocol API is required. We highlight that divergent lookups
should not replace convergent ones, hence we propose n-version-lookups which uses the n-version-
programming framework [Avi85] to build a combined lookup consisting of convergent and divergent
variants in order to achieve both, highly reliable and low latency operation.
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(a) W1, average message loss
(b) W1, average MC
(c) W2, average message loss
(d) W2, average MC
Figure 5.5: Convergent iterative lookup during taLEA.
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(a) W1, average message Loss
(b) W1, average MC
Figure 5.6: Convergent recursive lookup during taLEA.
(a) N = 50.000, w= 128, ρ ≈ 1,92 · 10−34 (b) N = 50.000, w= 16, ρ ≈ 0,762
(c) N = 100.000, w= 20, ρ ≈ 0,095 (d) N = 200.000, w= 20, ρ ≈ 0,190
Figure 5.7: Ratio of peers with LDEs to destination peer (blue boxes), no-dead-end ratio (red dia-
monds), number of peers (dashed).
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 5.8: Comparison of iterative divPASS vs. divRW, W1.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 5.9: Comparison of iterative divPASS vs. divRW, W2.
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(a) Lookup success rate (LSR)
(b) Message complexity (MC)
(c) Number of iterations (NoI)
Figure 5.10: Comparison of recursive divPASS vs. divRW, W1.
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6 Concluding Remarks
6.1 Summary & Conclusion
Contemporary large-scale applications increasingly apply P2P technology as it provides features such
as scalability, fault-tolerance, and decentralization. P2P protocols are often applied in data discovery
and data dissemination applications, e.g., file sharing, instant messaging, Car-2-Car communica-
tion, or the more general case of machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. M2M will expectedly
grow up to 11.5 billion mobile, M2M-enabled devices by 2019 [Cis15]. P2P provides inherent fault-
tolerance and hence allows for dependable service provision in perturbed operational environments.
Yet, this is just one side of the coin, as critical applications additionally require secure operation. An
adversary could for example violate the right to informational self-determination, induce venue loss,
or cause losses of life or equipment.
P2P architectures are essentially different from classical client/server architectures in a sense that
each peer usually has to fulfill client and server duties. Moreover, the data maintained by peers
is stored widely distributed. Both, system design and security requirements of P2P protocols are
consequently different from client/server architectures. Hence, new security weaknesses exist that
demand mitigating responses which are desired to pertain the beneficial features of P2P designs.
Firstly, as a ahead of our technical contributions, we discuss P2P security issues, including design
weaknesses, corresponding attacks, and mitigation techniques in Chapter 2 as contribution (C0).
In more detail, we focus on the so called Eclipse attack (EA) and specific localized variants. In
an EA, a set of malicious peers in the overlay network prevents benign peers from proper service
provision. Relating back to established security notions, an EA can be considered as a combination
of man-in-the-middle attacks, routing table poisoning, and distributed denial-of-service attacks. As
a consequence, EAs have the ability to affect all three security protection goals, i.e., availability,
confidentiality, and integrity. Moreover, one of the EA variants, the topology-aware localized Eclipse
attack (taLEA) is highly efficient. taLEAs achieve severe impacts using only a limited amount of peers
irrespective of the overlay network size. This leads to the first research question of this thesis:
(R1) What is the impact of taLEAs?
In order to investigate the impact of taLEAs on structured P2P protocols, we are focusing on the
lookup mechanism’s design weakness that exists in various P2P protocol implementations. Our first
technical contribution (C1) proposes a set of heuristics that reflect the lookup mechanisms of different
P2P protocols (cf. Chapter 4). The heuristics allow to estimate the amount of lookup calls which can
be intercepted by an attacker as a prerequisite action for launching a taLEA. The heuristics have been
validated using simulation experiments and our investigations yielded a significant taLEA impact,
i.e., on average 50% to 95% of the lookup calls could be intercepted.
After having established this initial baseline, we were interested in taLEA effects for a wider pa-
rameter landscape:
• Varied amounts of malicious peers.
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• P2P protocols with recursive lookup mechanism.
• Different application workload scenarios.
• Several churn scenarios.
• Up to five times larger overlay networks.
The previous parameter landscape has been considered in our second technical contribution (C2)
which includes a profound baseline measurement case study, too. It shows the significant impact of
taLEAs against various P2P protocols in a multitude of scenarios. Using only 4 malicious peers for a
taLEA results in roughly 20% lookup call interception for the W1 workload case and iterative routing.
In case for 64 malicious peers, lookup interception rates drop with only few exceptions below 60%.
For all baseline results the interception rate does not appear to drop for increasing overlay sizes,
which underlines the criticality of taLEAs. This observation leads to our second research question:
(R2) Is there a taLEA mitigation technique that does not sacrifice P2P’s benefits?
We have proposed divergent lookups as a taLEA mitigation technique. Our second technical contribu-
tion (C2) introduces a divergent lookup with a simple random walk search strategy (cf. Chapter 5).
The assessment of divergent lookups has been conducted using simulation experiments for a pa-
rameter subset of the baseline measurements. Moreover, the same metrics from the baseline study
were utilized for assessing divergent lookups to allow for a concise comparison in terms of reliability,
message complexity, and timeliness.
While the reliability of divergent lookups with random walks reaches 70% to 100%, the message
complexity results are about factor 5 higher compared to convergent lookups. Hence, we have pro-
posed a P2P address space slicing framework as our third technical contribution (C3), that can be
integrated with divergent lookups (cf. Chapter 5). The framework narrows down the search space
of the divergent lookup. To do so, the framework considers structural routing table properties to
identify address space regions that should be looked up due to their high amount of peers that know
the destination peer. The result of performing lookups in these specific regions only is a decrease
in message complexity compared to (C2) to a factor range of 1.5 to 2.5 compared to convergent
lookups. Furthermore, (C3) increases the reliability towards the range of 90% to 100%.
Overall, divergent lookups promote scalability, openness, anonymity, resource frugality, decentral-
ization, and heterogeneity. Therefore, the solution is applicable for a large set of scenarios. The
implementation overhead for divergent lookups is expected to be low.
6.2 Limitations
The analyses and techniques presented throughout this thesis are subject to the system model and
attack model which have been laid out in Chapter 3. Moreover, the following limitations are of
importance:
• We concentrate in our work on P2P protocols which use convergent lookup mechanisms, i.e.,
decrease on each iteration the distance towards the destination peer based on an address space
scale system.
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• The existence of shortcuts towards the victim peers (LDEs) in the topology is essential for
divergent lookups. In order for LDEs to be present, we expect that the overlay is not idle and
peers exchange messages at a reasonable rate.
• Malicious and victim peers may not join simultaneously, but are required to join with a given
time-wise delta. Otherwise, victim peers will not be exposed to the application workload and
consequently victim LDEs are unlikely to be established among victim and benign peers.
• The cost of divergent lookups using the address space slicing technique – in contrast to the
convergent variant – is slightly higher in terms of latencies and message complexity.
6.3 Future Research
The following directions for future research are currently envisaged:
• Advanced attack models: up to now, we were considering constant attacker behavior. This will
be changed in future work as a means of decreasing the probability of detecting malicious peers.
Moreover, attackers may on lookup message interception mount various malicious actions, we
will also focus on different of these variants. Moreover, we are assessing divergent lookups for
non topology-aware localized scenarios.
• Malicious information decay: an experimental case study about the decay of malicious informa-
tion over time that has been stored in the routing tables of benign peers for a wide parameter
landscape will be helpful to assess the efficiency of different attack and mitigation strategies.
• Decentralized detection: in more sophisticated attack models, the differentiation based on a
lookup result if the responding peer is either poisoned or malicious is not trivial. This problem
is a prerequisite for the next future research aspect:
• Routing table sanitizing: once a benign peer has detected a malicious peer, it should be removed
from as many routing tables as possible in order to decrease malicious peers attack capabilities.
This requires a carefully defined protocol in order to allow for secure operation, such that it
cannot be misused by an attacker.
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